Has Israel Reached the End of its Detente with Russia?

Iran Attack Israel

There had been signs for months that the “special” understandings reached between Putin and Bibi Netanyahu were fraying.  Afterall, Israel never chose to have Russia interject itself into the Syrian civil war, but once it had done so, Israel had no choice but to try to tame the Russian Bear.  The understandings reached allowed Israel a level of continued independence to strike out against Syrian convoys heading towards Lebanon.  When Iran started moving closer, Israel was allowed to hit sensitive figures.

Despite all of this, there was always the need to ask for permission and reestablish the understandings, which according to reports have contantly changed.

With Trump and Putin reaching an understanding at the G20 that allowed Russia to man the borders of Israel and Jordan in order to supposedly “enforce” a ceasefire, the understandings between Israel and Russia broke apart.

Israel can handle a Russia farther North from the Golan who is focused more on creating stability for its Mediteranean port at Latkia, but a Russia intensely involved with allowing Iranian troops and the militia it supports to reach the Golan border is completely unacceptable.

When Bibi travelled to Sochi over ten days ago, the prevailing assumption was that he would be able to convince Putin that it is in Russia’s best interest to hold back Iran and in failing to do so Israel would have no choice but to attack the Iranian forces.




Russia would have none of it and has since pushed back strongly against Israel’s verbage and protests against the Iranian presence on its border.

Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the following about Israel’s concerns that Iran is building up strength in the Golan to attack Israel:

 “We do not have any information that someone is preparing an attack on Israel. Whatever area of cooperation between Iran and Syria, my position is that if their cooperation in whichever field does not violate the basic provisions of international law, it should not be cause for question,” Lavrov said.

So the proverbial goal posts of past understandings between Israel and Russia have once again been moved, but in the direction of the Israeli border.  Where at one time Russia acquiesced to Israel’s concerns about Iran’s proximity to their Northeastern border, today they just have to “behave” and all is well.

The emerging crisis on Israel’s border with Syria is no small matter.  Under Russian protection Iranian troops can operate freely and this being the case, Iranian agents can always lay the groundwork to be ready when Russia changes the rules again.

Bibi Netanyahu has a huge choice to make.  He can either keep the facade that Russia is an honest broker between the Jewish state and Iran and therefore allow Israel to become fully surrounded and in a sense dependent on Russia for holding back Iran or he can drop the facade and take out the Iranian forces quickly establishing themselves in the Syrian Golan.

His choice will determine the costs involved when the war in Israel’s North begins.

 

THE STRATEGIC CASE FOR KURDISTAN

Why it may weaken US adversaries and strengthen our allies.

If the leaders of Iraqi Kurdistan aren’t intimidated into standing down, on September 25, the people of Iraqi Kurdistan will go to the polls to vote on a referendum for independence.

The Kurds have been hoping to hold the referendum since 2013.

Whereas Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu restated his support for Kurdish independence earlier this month in a meeting with a delegation of visiting Republican congressmen, the Trump administration has urged Kurdish President Masoud Barzani and his colleagues to postpone the referendum indefinitely. US Defense Secretary James Mattis, who visited with Barzani in the Kurdish capital of Erbil two weeks ago, said that the referendum would harm the campaign against Islamic State.

In his words, “Our point right now is to stay focused like a laser beam on the defeat of ISIS and to let nothing distract us.”

Another line of argument against the Kurdish referendum was advanced several weeks ago by The New York Times editorial board. The Times argued the Kurds aren’t ready for independence. Their government suffers from corruption, their economy is weak, their democratic institutions are weak and their human rights record is far from perfect.

While the Times’ claims have truth to them, the relevant question is compared to what? Compared to their neighbors, not to mention to the Times’ favored group the Palestinians, the Kurds, who have been self-governing since 1991, are paragons of good governance. Not only have they given refuge to tens of thousands of Iraqis fleeing ISIS, Iraqi Kurdistan has been an island of relative peace in a war-torn country since the US-led invasion in 2003.

Its Peshmerga forces have not only secured Kurdistan, they have been the most competent force fighting ISIS since its territorial conquests in 2014.

The same is the case of the Kurdish YPG militia in Syrian Kurdistan.

As for Mattis’s argument that the referendum, and any subsequent moves to secede from Iraq, would harm the campaign against ISIS, the first question is whether he is right.

If Mattis is concerned that the referendum will diminish Iranian and Turkish support for the campaign, then his concern is difficult to defend.

Turkey has never been a significant player in the anti-ISIS campaign. Indeed, until recently, Turkey served as ISIS’s logistical base.

As for Iran, this week Iranian-controlled Hezbollah and Lebanese military forces struck a deal to permit ISIS fighters they defeated along the Lebanese-Syrian border to safely transit Syria to ISIS-held areas along the Syrian border with Iraq. In other words, far from cooperating with the US and its allies against ISIS, Iran and its underlings are fighting a separate war to take ISIS out of their areas of influence while enabling ISIS to fight the US and its allies in other areas.

This then brings us to the real question that the US should be asking itself in relation to the Kurdish referendum. That question is whether an independent Kurdistan would advance or harm US strategic interests in the region.

Since the US and Russia concluded their cease-fire deal for Syria on July 7, Netanyahu has used every opportunity to warn that the cease-fire is a disaster.

In the interest of keeping Mattis’s “laser focus” on fighting ISIS, the US surrendered its far greater strategic interest of preventing Iran and its proxies from taking over the areas that ISIS controlled – such as the Syrian-Lebanese border and the tri-border area between Iraq, Syria and Jordan. As Netanyahu warns at every opportunity, Iran and its proxies are moving into all the areas being liberated from ISIS.

And Iran isn’t the only concern from either an Israeli or an American perspective. Turkey is also a looming threat, which will only grow if it isn’t contained.

Turkey’s rapidly accelerating anti-American trajectory is now unmistakable.

Last week during Mattis’s visit to Ankara, Turkish- supported militias in northern Syria opened fire on US forces. Not only did Turkey fail to apologize, Turkey condemned the US for retaliating against the attackers.

Moreover, last week, Turkish authorities announced they are charging US pastor Andrew Brunson with espionage, membership in a terrorist organization and attempting to destroy Turkey’s constitutional order and overthrow its parliament.

Brunson was arrested last October.

Whereas until last year’s failed military coup against the regime of President Recep Erdogan, Turkey demonstrated a firm interest in remaining a member of NATO and a strategic ally of the US, since the failed coup, Turkey has signaled that it at best, it is considering its options. US generals say that since the failed coup, they have almost no one to talk to in the Turkish military. Their interlocutors are either under arrest or too afraid to speak to them.

The regime and its supporters express both neo-Ottoman and neo-colonial aspirations, both of which place Turkey on a collision course with the US.

For instance, Melih Ecertas, the head of Erdogan AK Party’s youth wing, proclaimed that Erdogan is not merely the president of Turkey, rather he is “president of all the world’s Muslims.

So, too, Muslim Brotherhood leader Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi called Erdogan “the hope of all Muslims and of Islam.”

Qaradawi, who lives in Qatar and is Qatar’s Al Jazeera satellite channel’s superstar preacher, has good reason to love Erdogan.

In June, Erdogan decided to make a strategic move to protect the pro-Muslim Brotherhood and pro-Iranian Qatari regime from its angry neighbors, led by Saudi Arabia. Turkey’s deployment of forces to Doha stalled the Saudi-led campaign against the Qatari regime.

If the regime survives, and if world oil prices continue to drop and so weaken Saudi economic power, Turkey’s decision to deploy its forces to Qatar could be the first step toward realizing its neo-Ottoman ambitions.

As for neo-imperialism, last October Foreign Policy reported that Turkish television now uses a map from 1918 to define Turkey’s current borders. From 1918 through 1920, Turkish territory included large portions of Iraq, among them Kurdistan and Mosul, as well as large swaths of Syria, including Aleppo.

Foreign Policy reported that use of the map indicates that as the post-World War I map of the Middle East becomes obsolete, Erdogan sees an opportunity to expand Turkish territory.

Then there are Erdogan’s moves to build strategic ties with Russia and Iran.

Last November the NATO member announced it is negotiating the purchase of an S-400 air defense system from Russia.

As for Iran, last week Maj.-Gen, Mohammad Hossein Baghari, Iran’s chief of General Staff, paid the first official visit by an Iranian army chief to Turkey since the 1979 revolution. Baghari met not only by his Turkish counterpart, Gen. Hulusi Akar, but with Erdogan as well.

Erdogan said after the meeting that he and Baghari discussed possible joint military action against the Kurds in northern Iraq, Syria and Iran.

In his words, “Joint action against terrorist groups that have become a threat is always on the agenda.This issue has been discussed between the two military chiefs, and I discussed more broadly how this should be carried out.”

Baghari was more explicit. He effectively announced that Iran and Turkey will respond with force to the Kurdish referendum.

 

“Both sides stressed that if the [Kurdish] referendum would be held, it will be the basis for the start of a series of tensions and conflicts inside Iraq, the consequences of which will affect neighboring countries.”

Baghari continued, “Holding the referendum will get Iraq, but also Iran and Turkey involved and that’s why the authorities of the two countries emphasize that it is not possible and should not be done.”

 

This then brings us back to Israel and the US and why Netanyahu is right to support Kurdish independence and the Trump administration is wrong to oppose it.

So long as there is no significant change in the nature of the Iranian and Turkish regimes, their empowerment will come at the expense of the US, Israel and the Arab Sunni states.

The Kurds, with their powerful and experienced military forces in Iraq and Syria alike, constitute a significant check on both Iranian and Turkish power.

Several commentators argue that the Turks will respond to the Kurdish referendum by waging a war of annihilation against the Kurds in Iraq and beyond. Iran, they warn, will assist in Turkish efforts.

As far as Iran is concerned, in the near future, its central effort will remain in Syria. As for Turkey, whereas Erdogan and his followers may wish to undertake such a campaign, today it hard to imagine them succeeding.

A year after the failed coup, the Turkish military is astounding observers with its incompetent performance in Syria. Despite the fact that Turkish forces are fighting in Syria in areas adjacent to their border, they are unable to competently project their force.

Turkey’s underperformance in Syria makes clear that the Turkish armed forces, which Erdogan gutted in his purges of the officer and NCO corps in the wake of the failed coup, have not rebuilt their strength.

According to an analysis by Al-Monitor published last September, the first four rounds of purges in the immediate aftermath of the failed coup reduced the number of general officers by nearly 40%. The ratio of pilots to aircraft in the Turkish Air Force was reduced from more than three pilots per plane to less than one pilot per plane.

While Al-Monitor assessed last year that it would take up to two years for the Turkish Air Force to rebuild its pilot corps, last week it appeared that two years was a gross underestimation of the time required.

Last week the US rejected a Turkish request to have Pakistani pilots fly Turkish F-16s. The request owed to the critical shortage of pilots in the Turkish Air Force.

And Erdogan continues to purge his generals. In early August he sacked the commanders of Turkish land forces and the Turkish Navy.

Given the current state of Turkish forces on the one hand, and the battlefield competence of Kurdish forces, it is clear that the balance of the two forces has never been better for the Kurds.

If Kurdistan becomes independent with US and Israeli backing and survives, the implications for the longevity of the Erdogan regime, given the rapidly expanding size of the Kurdish minority in Turkey, are significant.

Likewise for Iran, an independent Kurdistan in Iraq will serve to contain Iranian power in Syria and potentially destabilize the Iranian regime at home.

In summary then, opponents of Kurdish independence are correct. An independent Kurdistan will destabilize the region. But contrary to their claims, this is a good thing. For the first time since 2009, destabilization will benefit the US and Israel and weaken Iran and Turkey.

Originally published by the Jerusalem Post

Are Turkey and Iran Teaming Up Against an Independent Kurdistan?

With the likely passage of the Kurdish Indpendence referendum st for September 25th, Tehran Times reported that “Major General Mohammad Bagheri, the chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, made a rare visit to Ankara where he met with his Turkish counterpart, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Turkey’s defense minister.”

Iran has continually pushed back against Kurdish Independence as has Turkey.  Both countries fear a free and independent Kurdistan will enable their large Kurdish populations to push for increased autonomy.  In Turey there are 20 million Kurds that live in second class conditions in Southeastern Turkey.  In Iran there are 15 million Kurds in the North West of the country.

“Holding the referendum is a natural and just right of the people of Kurdistan and no one other than the people of Kurdistan has the right to talk about it,” the Kurdish Peshmerga said in a statement released on Friday.

A rising Kurdistan will not only change the anatomy of the Middle East, but will thwart the hegemonic desires of both Turkey and Iran.

Although no one has declared armed conflict after the referendum, the threat is there.  The USA has even warned the Kurds not to go ahead just yet, but will not stop the vote. Given the large unknown factor after September 25th, most countries in the immediate vicinity are on edge.

Iran has accomplished a lot by subverting Iraq through its Shiite agents in Baghdad, but an overt move to Kurdish independence would roll back its advances and create a defacto Israeli ally on its borders. That would mean boh Kurdistan and Azerbaijan could give Israel an ability to take out Iran’s nuclear arsenal with ease.

This would mean that Israel could remain independent of the Saudi led Sunni alliance. This alone would weaken the leverage the Trump administration and the Saudis have in regard to Jewish biblical areas in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) deisired by the Arab world.

 

ERDOGAN’S GENOCIDAL INCITEMENT

Funding Palestinian Jew-hatred.

Turkey’s dictatorial president Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent efforts to mediate between the Saudis, their Arab Gulf allies and Egypt on one side versus his Qatari ally (both are staunch supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood) on the other, have failed to materialize.  At the same time, his war of words with Germany, and the European Union’s cold shoulder, has left the arrogant Erdogan with one avenue to make headlines – incite Muslims against Israel.  His crude anti-Semitic incitement has gone hand-in-hand with his posturing as the leader of the Sunni-Muslim world.

Erdogan has called on Muslims to show solidarity with the Palestinians by flooding Jerusalem’s Temple Mount.  He has used invectives against Israel with such words as “racist and discriminatory.” This comes after the Israeli government backed away from a confrontation with the incited Muslim community, and ordered the removal of the metal detectors and security cameras.  The Israeli actions followed a week of Palestinian rioting, and the murders of three Israeli family members by a Palestinian terrorist.  Erdogan declared that, “In our religionand historical responsibility for Al-Quds and the fight of our Palestinian brothers for rights and justice is of great importance to us.”

Israel’s Foreign Ministry was quick to respond to Erdogan’s repeated incitement (he previously ranted about a proposed bill that would ban the religious institution from using loudspeakers. Switzerland already banned loudspeakers in mosques.) It called Erdogan’s comments “baseless slander,” adding that, “anyone who systemically violates human rights in their own country should not preach about morality. It’s absurd that the Turkish government, which occupies Northern Cyprus, brutally represses the Kurdish minority and jails journalists, should lecture Israel, the only true democracy in the region. The days of the Ottoman Empire have passed.” The Foreign Ministry statement added, “Israel strictly adheres to protecting full freedom of worship for Jews, Muslims, and Christians – and will continue to do so despite this baseless slander.”

Build Jerusalem Fund

Erdogan’s incendiary remarks, in a speech to his party’s parliamentary group in Ankara, stated, “When Israeli soldiers recklessly pollute the grounds of Al-Aqsa with their combat boots by using simple issues as pretexts and then easily spill blood there, it is because we [Muslims] have not done enough to stake our claim over Jerusalem.” Turkey’s Erdogan is currently the chairman of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Clearly, in Erdogan’s mind, Jews and Israelis are merely dhimmis who should be disciplined by the Islamic Empire, and he considers himself a ‘Sultan’ of sorts.

Israeli political leaders reacted this time to Erdogan’s incitement with unsuppressed anger. Israel’s President Reuven Rivlin said, “We have heard voices which attack Israel for building Jewish life in Jerusalem. I must tell these people: For the last 150 years there has been a Jewish majority in Jerusalem. Even under the Ottoman Empire there was a Jewish majority in Jerusalem. Under Israeli sovereignty we continue to build Jerusalem, the eternal capital of the Jewish people.”

Jerusalem’s mayor, Nir Barkat, went even further in responding to Erdogan’s charges saying that, “Turkey ruled Jerusalem for 400 years under the Ottoman Empire.  It is surprising that Erdogan, who leads a state that occupied Jerusalem for 400 years, wants to preach to us about how to manage our city.  Unlike, during the Turkish occupation, Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty is a flourishing, open, and free city that allows freedom of religion and worship for all.  In recent years, record numbers of Muslims have visited the Temple Mount and held prayers, exercising their absolute freedom of religion under Israeli sovereignty.”  Barkat added, “The connection of the Jewish people to Jerusalem dates back more than 3,000 years.  Jerusalem is and will remain, our eternal united capital forever. In every corner of the city, we see Jewish roots – from the time of the First and Second Temple to the Muslim period and the Ottoman conquest.”

Israeli Knesset (Parliament) Speaker, Yuli Edelstein, said, “As long as Erdogan is Turkey’s leader, ties will not be back to what they were.”  Ex-Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon was more adamant, saying that “Erdogan aspires for there to be Muslim Brotherhood hegemony in the Middle East, and is working toward an Islamic Europe. This should be surprising only to those who ignore the facts.” Former Interior Minister Gideon Sa’ar, in an interview with 103FM Radio, stated that “We made a mistake by paying damages and apologizing for the Marmara incident.”

Erdogan’s latest attempt to scapegoat Israel with his Al-Aqsa speech comes after his failure to bring an end to the Arab Gulf crisis. In fact, Erdogan’s meddling on behalf of Qatar has cost Turkey a lucrative shipbuilding contract with the Saudis to sell four warships to the Saudi navy, worth $2 billion.  Erdogan’s expedited bill in the Turkish parliament to send Turkish soldiers to a Turkish military base in Qatar, doomed the prospects for expanding Turkish trade with the Arab Gulf states.

It was not only in the Middle East that Erdogan suffered a significant setback…he recently created a crisis with Germany as well. The relationship between the two countries had already soured.  Last March, the German government refused to allow Erdogan and his ministers to hold election campaigns in Germany.  In response, Erdogan accused the German government of implementing “Nazi practices.”  Turkey’s refusal to allow German parliament members to visit their contingent at the Incirlik air base led Germany to move its soldiers to Jordan. Things deteriorated further when the Turkish government arrested a Turkish-German journalist reporting for the German newspaper Die Welt on phony charges, alleging support for a terrorist organization.  Germany also provided political asylum for Turkish generals. Erdogan is holding German nationals in detention as a bargaining chip.

Erdogan’s spat with Israel didn’t advance his standing with Germany, the European Union or with the Arabs.  His anti-Israel and anti-Semitic tendencies were already on display in January, 2009 at the Davos, Switzerland World Economic Forum. At a panel discussion, Erdogan walked off the stage in protest because the moderator ended the discussion.  Yet he managed to say to the late Israeli President Shimon Peres, “When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill.” He was referring to Israel’s campaign in Gaza in retaliation for Hamas’ missile attacks on Israel. Peres responded by saying Turkey would have reacted the same way had rockets been falling on Istanbul. In May, 2010, a Turkish organized flotilla attempting to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza, resulting in Israeli commandos boarding the Turkish Islamist lead ship, the Navi Marmara. Nine violent Turkish Islamists died in the confrontation with Israel, which the Turks provoked.  Erdogan called for Israel to be punished for its “bloody massacre.”

Erdogan assumed dictatorial powers following an April referendum in Turkey, and has jailed at least 47,155people without charges in the wake of last year’s failed coup against his continued rule. A consistently bellicose supporter of the Palestinians, Erdogan has frequently made anti-Semitic remarks, along with veiled threats to the Turkish Jewish community.

Erdogan is providing money to Palestinians to continue their violent demonstrations against Israel, allegedly to “defend” Al-Aqsa. This is a dangerous game the megalomaniacal Erdogan is playing in order gain influence with the Arab masses, ultimately, at the cost of Palestinian and Israeli blood.

Originally Published on FrontPageMag.

The Humanitarian Paradigm- Hobson’s Choice for Israel (Part I)

Only one policy paradigm can sustain Israel as the nation-state of the Jews and prevent it becoming untenable either geographically or demographically—or both.

…when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth, – Sherlock Holmes in “The Sign of the Four”

Hobson’s Choice: a situation in which it seems that you can choose between different things or actions, but there is really only one thing that you can take or do – Cambridge Dictionary

As the more-than– century old dispute between Jews and Arabs over control of the Holy Land nears its third post-Oslo decade , four archetypical approaches have emerged in the public discourse for its resolution—and one for its “management”(a.k.a. its perpetuation).

In this two-part series I will assess the merits (or lack thereof) of these various approaches –both those which endorse (full or partial) Israeli annexation of territory across the pre-1967 Green Line and those which eschew it.

Indeed as I will show—barring divine intervention (something only the more pious than myself can rely on as a policy input—of these five (four plus one) options, all but one are demonstrably incompatible with the long-term survival of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.  All but one—demonstrably—do not address adequately either the geographic imperatives and/or the demographic imperatives that Israel must address to avoid becoming either geographically untenable or demographically untenable (or both).  

Israel as the nation-state of the Jews

It is—or at least should be—manifestly self-evident that for Israel to endure over time as the nation-state of the Jews, it cannot (a) withdraw to geographical/topographical confines that make it impossible to maintain ongoing socio-economic routine in the country’s major commercial centers, or (b) allow the Jewish majority to be so diminished that maintenance of the Jewish nature of the state is imperiled.

Accordingly, it is in terms of their ability to contend with these undeniable imperatives that the alternative proposals for resolution/management for the conflict must be evaluated as appropriate policy prescriptions for Israel if—at the risk of appearing repetitive—it is to retain its status as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

I belabor this point of the long-term preservation of Jewish sovereignty, as a necessary precondition for the acceptability of competing policy proposals, because if one is prepared to forego it, other proposals, which are unable to ensure such an outcome, may well be acceptable—like for instance the post-Zionist call for a non-Jewish state of all its citizens.

Bearing this brief introductory clarification in mind, let’s begin the critical analysis of the proffered alternatives, which this week I shall confine to policy proposals that eschew full or partial  Israeli annexation of territory—deferring analysis of those that endorse such annexation for next week.

Managing the Conflict: Mowing the lawn won’t cut it

The conflict management  approach—as opposed to conflict resolution – is ostensibly the least proactive, least provocative—and most pessimistic—largely reflecting the recent assessment of Jared Kushner that there may well be no solution to the Arab-Israeli  confrontation.   

In a column written last August, I pointed out the grave detriments this approach entailed, detailing how, over the last two-and- half decades, the military prowess of the terrorist organizations have developed far beyond anything imagined,  and how Israel’s political positions have been drastically eroded.

Thus, when Israel left Gaza (2005), the range of the Palestinian rockets was barely 5 km., and the explosive charge they carried about 5 kg. Now, their missiles have a range of over 100 km. and warheads of around 100 kg. Likewise, when Israel left Gaza, only the sparse population in its immediate proximity was threatened by missiles. Now, well over 5 million Israelis, well beyond Tel Aviv, are menaced by them. Moreover the terror organizations have exploited periods of calm to further enhance their infrastructures and other abilities, which were barely conceivable a decade ago—including a massive tunneling enterprise and the development of naval forces, commandoes and underwater capabilities.

But it is not only in the exponential growth of the terror groups’ martial prowess that the endeavor at conflict management has been a resounding failure. The same can be said—arguably even more so–with regard to the ever-tightening political constraints Israel faces.

Mowing the lawn won’t cut it (cont.)

Perhaps one of the most dramatic and disturbing indications of just how far Israeli positions have been rolled back over the last two decades is reflected in the views articulated by Yitzhak Rabin, in his last Knesset address (October 5, 1995), a month before his assassination. In it he sought parliamentary ratification of the Oslo II Accords, then considered by much of the Israeli public as excessively dovish and dangerously concessionary.

There can be little doubt that if today, Netanyahu were to embrace, verbatim, Rabin’s 1995 prescription for a permanent accord with the Palestinian-Arabs in the “West Bank , he would be dismissed—scornfully, disparagingly and angrily—as an “unreasonable extremist”.

It of course requires little analytical acumen and a mere smidgeon of common sense to grasp that–whatever one may believe the real size of the  Arab population of Judea-Samaria to be—Israel cannot keep  an increasing and increasingly recalcitrant and irredentist population indefinitely in a state of suspended disenfranchised political limbo.  

In this regard, it should be remembered that, today, with the changing nature of Arab enmity, the major existential challenge to Israel’s existence as the Jewish nation-state is no longer repulsing invasion, but resisting attrition—both militarily and politically.

Accordingly, by eschewing decisive proactive measures to contend with a predicament that entails a mounting threat and decreasing freedom to deal with it, “conflict management” has become a prescription for avoiding immediate confrontations that can be won, thereby risking having to contend with later confrontations that cannot be won—or can be won only at ruinous cost.

Two-States: A mega-Gaza overlooking Tel Aviv?

Of course, the policy paradigm which, for decades, has dominated the discourse on how to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict  is that advocating a two-state outcome.   Bizarrely, support for this formula has always been the sine-qua-non for admission into “polite company” while opposition to it was the perceived hallmark of the uncouth and ignorant.  

Just how perverse this situation is can be gauged from the fact that there is no persuasive reason to believe –and certainly none has ever been provided by two-state proponents – that a Palestinian state will be anything other than a homophobic, misogynistic, Muslim-majority tyranny, whose hallmarks would be: gender discrimination, gay persecution, religious intolerance, and political oppression of dissidents—and which would rapidly become a bastion for Islamist terror.

After all, one might well ask, why would anyone purporting to profess to liberal values, wish to endorse the establishment of such an entity — which is clearly the utter negation of the very values invoked for its establishment?!

Readers will recall that it was in Gaza that the initial optimistic attempts to implement the two-state idea were made. So, how events unfolded there should be instructive as to how they may be expected to unfold in Judea-Samaria. For in the absence of a compelling argument to the contrary—and as mentioned, none has ever been presented—there is little reason to believe that  if Israel were to evacuate the “West Bank”  the outcome  would not be largely similar to that which followed Israel’s evacuation of Gaza.

Indeed, unsubstantiated hope aside, there is neither sound theoretical foundation nor empirical evidence on which two-state proponents can base any prognosis for the  success of their political credo.  

A mega-Gaza (cont.)

Accordingly, the prudent working assumption must be that any attempt to implement the two-state principle in Judea-Samaria will result in a “mega-Gaza”—and that measures, similar to those required to protect the Israeli population in the South, would be required as well on Israel’s eastern border.

But unlike Gaza, which abuts sparsely populated, largely rural areas, the “mega-Gaza” that almost certainly will emerge in Judea-Samaria would abut Israel’s most populous urban areas. Unlike Gaza, which has no topographic superiority over adjacent Israeli territory, the prospective “mega-Gaza” in Judea-Samaria will totally command the adjacent coastal megalopolis, in which much of Israel’s vital infrastructure (both civilian and military) is located, where 80 percent of its civilian population resides and 80% of its commercial activity takes place.

But perhaps most significantly, unlike Gaza, which has only about a 50-km. front with Israel, the envisioned “mega-Gaza” in Judea-Samaria would have a front of up to almost 500 km!

Accordingly, what might be expected to concentrate two-staters’ minds, more than anything is that, after evacuating Gaza, Israel is now undertaking what IDF Chief-of Staff, Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisencott, called the “largest project” ever carried out in the history of the IDF—a wall along the entire Israel-Gaza border,  not only several  storeys above ground but – to contend with the tunnel threat– several storeys below it !!  Now imagine a project over ten times that scale along a “mega-Gaza” in the east…

Next week: Analyzing Annexation

As mentioned, next week I will focus attention on those approaches which advocate full or partial annexations of the territories across the 1967 Green Line. In the analysis I will demonstrate that without an operational plan for dramatically reducing the Arab presence  east of the Jordan River, the former will result in the Lebanonization of Israel, creating a single society so fractured by interethnic strife that it would be untenable as the nation- state of the Jewish people; while the latter will result in the Balkanization of Israel, dividing the territory up into disconnected autonomous enclaves, which will be recalcitrant, rivalrous and rejectionist, creating an ungovernable reality for Israel.

Accordingly, by a logical process of elimination, I will show that the Humanitarian Paradigm, advocating funded emigration of the Arab residents of Judea-Samaria (and eventually Gaza) is the only policy paradigm consistent with the long term survival of Israel as the nation-state of the Jews, and hence—for those dedicated to the preservation of the Zionist ideal—Hobson choice.