After Raqqa Falls, Can an Israeli Supported Kurdistan Reshape the Middle East?

With the battle for Raqqa about to get underway, those countries looking to pickup the scraps after ISIS is dead and buried are numerous, but essentially fall into two categories.  The first are Iran, Russia, Allawite Syria, and Turkey.  The second group is made up of the emerging Sunni alliance led by Saudi Arabia, Syrian opposition groups, the Kurds, and Israel.

The emerging strong man in the battle for Raqqa is the YPG, which is the American backed Kurdish militia of Northern Syria.  Just like the Peshmerga in Iraq, the Kurds in Syria fight with the same determination against ISIS.  Yet, with ISIS on the run and the Kurds fully backed by the USA a post caliphate Middle East is already emerging. It is clear as that the Turks have increasing nightmares of a Kurdish state rising on their border from the Mediterranean to Iran. Furthermore, this Kurdish state would be backed by the USA. the irony cannot be mistaken as the plan of the Shiites led by Iran has always been to create a corridor from Tehran to the Mediterranean.

The battle after Rakka will be an attempt to destroy the nascent Kurdistan by Turkish and Shiite forces.  The Turks opposed the US arming of the YPG a month ago.  One Turkish official said the the decision to arm the YPG was “tantamount to placing dynamite under Turkey-USA relations.”

Kurdistan – Image Source – PANONIAN

Israel Must Back Syrian Kurds

With Iran on the march and the US still trying to find its footing in the Middle East, the long standing covert alliance between Iraqi Kurdistan and Israel, must be applied to the YPG and the autonomous Kurdish cantons in Northern Syria.  The only force capable of providing stability East of the Levant are the Kurds. They, like the Jews, Druze, and Arameans have been systematically displaced over the 1400 year Jihad led by arabized Muslims who were only indigenous to Saudi Arabia until they pushed out of the Arabian peninsula after Muhammad died.

ISIS was conceived by the Obama administration, Turkey, and the Gulf States to hold back Iranian influence in the region.  The problem was that this entity turned on its masters and subsequently invited itself to be destroyed.  The Kurds, whom most of the players used and then abused over the years are the only stable option to holding back the rising Shiite influence in the area. The challenge is that Erdogan’s Turkey has decided that Iran is a far better partner than allowing a sovereign Kurdish entity from exposing the myth of Turkish control and historical continuity in the region.

The Trump Administration has clearly opted for the approach that backs a rising Kurdistan despite the threats from Turkey in doing so. The lines are being drawn.

Post Raqqa, the real war will begin.  Israel’s backing of a rising Kurdish state can ensure a totally different Middle East.

New Law: Businesses to be Fined for Refusing Service to IDF Soldiers

A new law passed on Monday by the Knesset will subject businesses to a fine of up to 50,000 NIS for discriminating against uniformed IDF soldiers.

The legislation, submitted by Yisrael Beitenu Party Chairman, MK Robert Ilatov, was first drafted in the previous Knesset following an incident in 2010 where reservists were refused service at the Azad restaurant in Haifa.

The restaurant was filmed by the Zionist organization Im Tirtzu refusing service to uniformed IDF soldiers, and was forced by the Haifa Magistrate’s Court to pay a fine of 5,000 NIS. According to Im Tirtzu, there have since been a number of additional cases of discrimination against uniformed IDF soldiers, including in Jerusalem.

Yisrael Beitenu Party Chairman, MK Robert Ilatov, noted how until now there has been no explicit legislation prohibiting such acts of discrimination.

“In light of numerous cases of discrimination against uniformed soldiers, I decided that there needed to be legislation prohibiting this from occurring in public places, including restaurants, entertainment venues and educational institutions,” said Ilatov.

“Our uniformed men and women are not only deserving not to suffer from discrimination, but to be honored for their public service to the State of Israel.”

Matan Peleg, CEO of Im Tirtzu which was among the initiators of the law, said: “It is inconceivable that in the State of Israel, there are those who would discriminate against IDF soldiers. This is fueled by an anti-Zionist ideology that seeks to uproot the values of the state from within.”

“For generations upon generations, Jews have dreamed of having a Jewish army in the Land of Israel,” added Peleg. “Im Tirtzu, as the largest Zionist movement in Israel, is committed to continue safeguarding this dream.”

THE LIMITS OF ISRAELI POWER

Time for Israel to take control of its future.

On Thursday, US President Donald Trump bowed to the foreign policy establishment and betrayed his voters. He signed a presidential waiver postponing the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem for yet another six months.

Ahead of Trump’s move, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a last-ditch bid to convince Trump to move the embassy to Jerusalem. But it was not to be.

Israel’s failure to convince Trump to do what he repeatedly promised US voters he would do during his presidential campaign shows the disparity in power between Israel and the US.

Israel lacks the power to convince foreign nations to recognize its capital – much less to locate their embassies there. The US, on the other hand, not only has the power to recognize Jerusalem and transfer its embassy to Israel’s capital whenever it wishes to do so, it also has the ability to convince dozens of other countries to immediately follow its lead.

The disparity between what the Americans can do and what Israel can do was on display on Monday evening in a glittering hall at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. There, Bar-Ilan University conferred its Guardian of Zion award on former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton. In his acceptance speech, Bolton presented his vision for the resolution of the Palestinian conflict with Israel.

Bolton’s views are important not merely because his past work at the State Department and the UN brought the US some of its only diplomatic victories in recent decades. His views are important as well because of his close relationship with Trump.

Bolton began his discussion Monday evening by rejecting the “two-state solution.” The two-state model, he noted, has been tried and has failed repeatedly for the past 70 years. There is no reason to believe that it will succeed now. This is particularly true, he said, given the lack of Palestinian social cohesion.

Hamas controls Gaza. The PLO, which is supposed to be Israel’s peace partner, barely controls parts of Judea and Samaria. At a time when more cohesive Arab societies are unraveling, the notion that a Palestinian state would survive and advance regional peace and stability is laughable, Bolton argued.

Bolton then turned to his preferred policy for resolving the Palestinian conflict with Israel, which he dubbed “the three-state solution.” Under his plan, Egypt and Jordan would work with Israel to solve the Palestinian conflict. Egypt would take over the Gaza Strip and Jordan would negotiate the status of Judea and Samaria with Israel.

The crowd at the King David responded enthusiastically to Bolton’s proposal. This is not surprising.

Since 1967, Israelis have hoped for Jordan and Egypt to work with them to solve the problem of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza who lived under Jordanian and Egyptian occupation from 1949-1967.

Unfortunately, Israel’s support for Bolton’s plan is irrelevant. Israel is powerless to advance it. Israel cannot convince Arab nations to help it resolve the Palestinian conflict any more than it can convince the PLO to cut a peace deal with it.

Like PLO leaders, the leaders of the Arab world know that they cannot help Israel with the Palestinians.

Doing so would involve disowning the Palestinian narrative.

The Palestinian narrative claims that the Jews of Israel are colonialist interlopers who stole the land from the Palestinians, its rightful owners. The narrative makes no distinction between Tel Aviv and Hebron. All of Israel is a crime against the Arab world. All of Israel is illegitimate.

The overwhelming majority of the Arab world believes the Palestinian narrative. For an Arab leader to walk away from it or even to signal an attenuation of his fealty to it in the interest of regional peace would be the riskiest of moves.

Israel has nothing to offer Arab leaders that could induce them to take that risk.

Although it is far from certain, the US may very well have the ability to convince Arab leaders to do so. If Trump decided that this is the way to advance peace in the Arab world, chances are he would make some headway. In other words, Bolton’s three-state plan is a plan that only America can adopt. It cannot be an Israeli plan no matter how enthusiastically the public supports involving Jordan and Egypt in solving the conflict.

Given Israel’s inability to offer the Arabs anything valuable enough for Arab leaders to risk life and limb to accept in exchange for helping to solve the Palestinian conflict, as Israel considers its own options in relation to the Palestinians, it needs to limit its goals to things that it can achieve without them. In other words, the only steps that Israel can take in relation to the Palestinians are unilateral steps.

For the past 50 years, hoping that the Arabs – and since 1993, the PLO – would finally make peace with it and so settle the permanent status of Judea and Samaria, Israel refused to take any unilateral actions in relation to its permanent interests in Judea and Samaria. Rather than apply its legal code to Judea and Samaria, it opted for the stop-gap measure of installing a military government to run the areas on the basis of Jordanian law.

Between 1994 and 1996, Israel canceled the military government in the Palestinian population centers in Judea and Samaria and Gaza. In 2005, when it withdrew, it canceled the residual military government in the rest of Gaza. Since then, the only area that remains under the Israeli military government is Area C in Judea and Samaria. Area C includes all of the Israeli communities in Judea and Samaria, and strategically critical areas including the Jordan Valley, the Samaria mountain range and the south Hebron Hills.

On Tuesday, Prime Minister Netanyahu gave an interview with Army Radio where he set out part of his vision for the permanent status of Judea and Samaria. He limited his statement to the military status of the areas. He said that under any possible future scenario, Israel must retain full security control of the areas. This, he said, is the lesson of Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

That pullout led to the transformation of Gaza into a Hamas-controlled hub of global jihad. Moreover, under Hamas, the Palestinians turned Gaza into one big, densely populated missile-launching pad against Israel.

While justified, Netanyahu’s position obscures more than it illuminates about his long-term vision for Judea and Samaria.

What does he mean by security control? Would the IDF remain in sole control over Israel’s eastern boundaries or would it serve as an overall coordinator of foreign forces operating along the border? Would IDF forces be confined to fortified positions while the Palestinians reign free in the open areas, as was the case in southern Lebanon in the years leading up to Israel’s disastrous withdrawal in 2000? Or would the IDF have freedom of action and maintain the initiative throughout Judea and Samaria? Moreover, does Netanyahu envision the IDF remaining the only military organization operating in Judea and Samaria in the long term? Beyond the security issues that require clarification, Netanyahu’s statements make no mention of the rights of Jews to live in Judea and Samaria.

Does he believe that Jews should be permitted to live permanently in the areas that Israel controls? If so, why are they subjected to the Jordanian legal code used by the military government and which proscribes their right to purchase land and register land sales? This brings us to the issue of governance. What does Netanyahu think about the military government in Area C? Does he believe that the 50-year reign of generals should continue until the Arabs choose to resolve the Palestinian conflict with Israel? What if this means that the generals will continue to rule over hundreds of thousands of Israeli citizens for another 50 or 100 or 150 years? Does he, on the other hand, prefer to transfer governance responsibility in Area C to the Palestinians and place the nearly 500,000 Israelis in the area under Palestinian control? In the course of his remarks, Bolton noted that if Jordan is responsible for the Palestinians of Judea and Samaria, the issue of Jerusalem will be removed from the equation. After all, if their capital is Amman, Israel has no reason to divide its capital city.

And this brings us back to Jerusalem, which Trump spurned on Thursday.

As is the case today, 50 years ago, Israel had no power to influence the positions of foreign governments regarding its capital city. But in contrast to its decision to establish a military government in Judea and Samaria, Israel didn’t wait for foreigners to give it permission to act where it had the power to act in order to change the status of the city and ensure its ability to govern and control its capital for generations to come.

In 1967, the government voted to expand the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem to include the eastern, northern and southern quarters that had been under Jordanian occupation since 1949.

Everyone benefited from the move – including the foreign powers that still refuse to recognize the simple fact that Jerusalem is Israel’s capital.

Washington and the rest of the governments of the world know that their refusal to recognize Israel’s capital does not endanger Israel or its control of Jerusalem. They are free to bow to Arab pressure, safe in the knowledge that Israel will continue to protect the unified city.

Trump’s decision to sign the waiver delaying the embassy move is a betrayal of his campaign promise, but it doesn’t change the situation in Jerusalem. Last week, Israel celebrated 50 years of sovereignty over its united capital. Jerusalem will be neither more nor less united if and when the US moves its embassy to the capital.

Perhaps Trump will eventually keep his word and move the embassy. Perhaps he will continue to breach his promise. And as far as the Palestinians are concerned, perhaps Trump adopts Bolton’s three-state plan in relation to Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Perhaps he will maintain his predecessors’ slavish devotion to the establishment of a PLO state.

Israel can’t control what Trump will do any more than it can influence what the Arabs will do. And so it needs to take a lesson not only from its bitter experience of withdrawing from Gaza, but from its positive experience of taking matters into its own hands in Jerusalem.

The time has come, at the outset of the second 50 years of Israeli control over Judea and Samaria, for Israel to take matters into its own hands. Our leaders must stop beating around the bush. They need to use the powers they have to secure Israel’s military and civilian interests in Judea and Samaria for the next 50 years as best they can. And they need to stop waiting for someone else to solve our problems for us.

Originally published by the Jerusalem Post

The Humanitarian Paradigm – Answering FAQs (Part 1)

Dispelling doubts as to the feasibility (and morality) of largescale, financially incentivized emigration as the only non-kinetic approach to resolve the Israel-Palestinian impasse.

Consideration should be given even to the heroic remedy of transfer of populations…the hardship of moving is great, but it is less than the constant suffering of minorities and the constant recurrence of war

President Herbert Hoover, The “Great Humanitarian”, in “The Problems of Lasting Peace”.

 

With all the money that has been invested in the problem of the Palestinians, it would have been possible long ago to resettle them and provide them with good lives in Arab countries.  Andrei Sakharov, cited in “The New Republic, June 22, 2009.

The rise in the number of international migrants reflects the increasing importance of international migration, which has become an integral part of our economies and societies. Well-managed migration brings important benefits to countries of origin and destination, as well as to migrants and their families-. Wu Hongbo, UN Under-Secretary-General, 2016.

 

 

Followers of this column will recall that for well over a decade I have promoted what I have designated: “The Humanitarian Paradigm” (HP).  This paradigm prescribes, among other things, large-scale financially incentivized emigration of the Palestinian-Arab population, resident across the pre-1967 lines, as the only comprehensive, non-kinetic policy blueprint that can enable Israel to adequately address both the Geographic and the Demographic Imperatives, which it needs to contend with in order to endure as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

 

Unfounded skepticism

 

Several reservations have been raised regarding my proposed prescription on various grounds, including skepticism as to its economic affordability, political feasibility and moral acceptability. Some have claimed that an alleged sense of “intense nationalism”, social pressures, and fear of retributory fratricide will preclude any chance of large-scale emigration of Palestinian-Arabs.

 

Such skepticism flies in the face of logical reasoning, historical precedents, empirical findings and the revealed preferences of significant segments of the Palestinians-Arabs themselves.   

 

Accordingly, in the ensuing paragraphs I will attempt to address these reservations, show them to be largely unfounded, and demonstrate that the HP is not only eminently feasible but unequivocally imperative if the Jews are to preserve their national independence and political sovereignty.

 

But before addressing the FAQs (Frequently Asked Questions) regarding such feasibility, allow me to convey—in brutal brevity—what sets the HP apart from ALL other proposals for resolution.

 

This differentiation resolves chiefly around two elements: (a) the atomization of implementation; (b) the de-politicization of context.

 

With regard to the former, since the envisaged compensation will be offered directly to individual family heads/breadwinners, no agreement with any Arab collective (whether state or sub-state organization) is required—merely the accumulated consent of fate-stricken individuals, striving to improve their lot.

 

With regard to the later, this reflects a sober recognition that, after decades of effort, involving the expenditure of huge political capital and economic resources, there is no political formula for resolution of the conflict and efforts should be channeled into dissipating the humanitarian predicament of the Palestinian-Arabs.

 

FAQ 1: How much will it cost?

 

One of the most common queries raised as to the practicality of the HP is the question of cost.

 

In addressing this issue, it is important to keep three things in mind:

 

(a) The absolute cost of implementation is irrelevant; (b) There is inherent difficulty in reaching precise estimates of the required outlay; however (c) There is no need for fine-tuned precision estimates, since political resolve is the real constraint on implementation– not economic resources.

 

As to the first of these points, it is crucial to grasp that the absolute cost of the proposed measures is not really the issue, but rather the comparative cost, relative to other proposals – including the two-state formula – whose implementation is also certain to entail an ongoing multi-billion dollar price tag. Indeed, one of the few (arguably, the only) comprehensive study of the overall cost of the Oslo Process suggests that by 2014 it inflicted expenditures—excluding the cost of the 50-day long Operation Protective Edge—of almost a trillion shekels (a quarter trillion dollars) on Israel’s economy—producing nothing but trauma and tragedy for Jew and Arab alike.  

As to the second point: The overall cost for large-scale relocation and rehabilitation of the Palestinian population across the  pre-1967 lines clearly depends not only on the scope of emigration grants offered, but on the  actual size of the Palestinian-Arab population in Judea-Samaria and Gaza.  In this regard there is fierce ongoing debate regarding the true population figures for Judea, Samaria and Gaza – with a discrepancy of well over a million between competing estimates.

 

Calculating Costs (cont.)

 

Fortunately, precise appraisals of the required costs are not essential for assessing the affordability of the HP. Rough order-of-magnitude estimates are sufficient for this purpose. Indeed, as we shall see, the amounts required are dwarfed by the expenditures on other international ventures—which, predictably, produced results which, charitably, can be dubbed “disappointing”.

 

As I do not wish to become embroiled in an argument as to the real size of the Palestinian-Arab population, and as the envisaged financial grants would be distributed per family unit, I shall sidestep the issue and take as my point-of-departure a figure of 850,000 families (just over 60% in Judea-Samaria). This is far closer to the official Palestinian figures than to the alternative, more optimistic (and plausible) demographic estimates, which are almost 300,000 families lower! Assuming an average emigration grant of US$250-300,000 per family (which is roughly 100 years of GDP per capita in Palestinian terms) this would amount to a total budget of US$200-250 billion for the full implementation of the HP project.

 

While these figures might appear somewhat daunting, two points should be borne in mind: Today Israel’s annual GDP is approaching US$300 billion. Accordingly the total outlay would be 8-10 months of GDP.

 

Assessing affordability (cont.)

 

Spreading this over, say, a decade-and-a-half (considerably less time than has been invested in the fatally flawed two-state endeavor) this would amount to 4.5-5.5% of total GDP. Accordingly, even if Israel was to bear this economic burden on its own, adding it  to the current levels of defense spending (5-6%), the economic burden would not reach the defense expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, through much of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s (11-15%).         

 

Moreover, if the wider international community could be induced to help shoulder the task, the entire enterprise could be completed far more rapidly, at a cost which would be virtually imperceptible, amounting to a mere fraction of a percentage point of the GDP of the OECD nations.

 

It must be firmly emphasized that the sums referred to here are inconsequential in global terms. Indeed, they pale into insignificance when compared to the multi-trillion dollar cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, of which over 90% was spent after (!) Saddam Hussein was apprehended and the Taliban dislodged, and which, even by most benign assessments, produced, at best, meagre results.

 

Accordingly it would appear that financial resources for a program that would cost considerably less than 10% of the cost of those engagements is not a real impediment to its implementation.

 

FAQ 2: Is large-scale financially-induced Palestinian emigration feasible?

 

Of course, no-one knows precisely how many Palestinian-Arabs can be induced to emigrate without putting the matter to test. However, available evidence strongly suggests that extensive emigration is indeed eminently feasible. And there is certainly far more empirical support for it than there is for a stable two-state outcome.

 

A survey I commissioned as far back as December 2004 for the Jerusalem Summit, and conducted by a leading  Israeli polling institute, in collaboration with a well-known Palestinian center, showed that over 40% of the Arab residents of Judea-Samaria had actively considered emigration, while up to 50% did not discount such a possibility – even without being offered any material inducement. When the question of material compensation was introduced to encourage such emigration, the figure rose to over 70%!

 

It appears that this sentiment has only grown stronger over time.

 

Since then, a veritable slew of opinion surveys has emerged from Palestinian institutes showing a keen wish among the Palestinian-Arab population to emigrate. Thus, in 2007 the New York Times cited polls for Birzeit University, showing “35 percent of Palestinians over the age of 18 want to emigrate. Nearly 50 percent of those between 18 and 30 would leave if they could”.

 

Feasibility of financially-induced emigration (cont.)

 

Indeed the desire to emigrate grew so wide-spread that the Palestinian Authority’s mufti felt compelled to issue a  fatwa forbidding Muslims to leave, and berating the fact that “Many are continuing to rush to the gates of the embassies and consulates of the Western nations with requests for visas in order to reside permanently in those countries.”

 

Current polls conducted by the Ramallah-based Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research show, regularly and repeatedly, that between 25-35% of the Arab residents of Judea-Samaria and 45-55% in Gaza wish to emigrate permanently.

But perhaps more compelling than the findings of any poll are the revealed behavioral preferences of the residents of Gaza, who are paying massive bribes to extricate themselves from the grim realities of life there, risking drowning at sea in rickety boats, desperate to seek a better life elsewhere. These headlines in Al Jazeera and Al Monitor bear poignant testimony to their predicament and despair:  Palestinians paying thousands in bribes to leave Gaza; Escaping Gaza, hundreds of Palestinians drown; Gaza’s intellectuals are fleeing abroad.

Surely then, establishing an orderly system of ample financial aid to enable them to extricate themselves from the dire situation which the misguided attempt to foist statehood on them has precipitated, would  be eminently more humane, moral and pragmatic.

 

FAQ 3: But who would accept them?

 

One of the most frequently asked questions regarding the feasibility of the HP is “Which countries will accept them?”

 

I find this question particularly puzzling – especially given today’s realities of massive global population flows. Indeed, the UN recently published a report on global migration, revealing that in 2015 there were almost a quarter-billion migrants globally (up 40% since 2000), the majority of which were motivated by economic considerations. Thus it is difficult to understand why an envisaged yearly increase of a fraction of 1% in this number over the next decade would be such an inconceivable event.

 

Moreover, it should be recalled that, in contrast to many other migrants, the Palestinian-Arab recipients of generous relocation grants would not be arriving as a stream of destitute refugees.  Rather they would be arriving in an orderly fashion as individual immigrants of relative affluence by global standards, who traditionally have brought great benefit to the host countries that have accepted them.

 

In addition, the funds the Palestinian-Arab newcomers would bring with them would constitute a very significant influx into the host countries’ economies. Indeed, for every hundred Palestinian families admitted, the host country could count on the influx of around US$25-30 million into its economy. Absorbing 2,500 new Palestinian-Arab family units could mean the injection of up to three-quarter billion dollars into the host nation’s economy.

 

Who would accept them? (cont.)


Consider the following example, which if not entirely realistic, is instructive in conveying the principle involved.

 

Suppose Indonesia – the world’s most populous Muslim country – were to open its gates to the Palestinian-Arabs across the pre-1967 lines, who, in turn, decided to emigrate to that country. This would entail an increase of a little over 1% of the Indonesian population (around 270 million) but an influx of over US $ 250-300 billion into the Indonesian economy, where total GDP is around US $ 900 billion. Moreover, each of the Palestinian breadwinners would arrive with a sum worth around 80 years of Indonesian GDP per capita (around US$ 3,500)  – the equivalent of over US$ 4 million in the US. Accordingly, they would in no way be impoverished refugees, or a burden on the local society/economy. Quite the opposite. They would be rather well-to-do individuals, capable of making a positive contribution to their new homeland

 

It is of course unrealistic to believe that all the Palestinians would head for a single destination. However if Palestinian-Arab emigration was distributed over several countries, they could be absorbed, resettled and rehabilitated with very little difficulty by a number of host nations with compatible domestic socio-cultural and religious environments – with the financial benefits accruing to these host nations being proportional to number of Palestinian-Arab immigrants they accept.

 

Next week…

 

Given the crucial importance of this issue, I intend to continue this response to FAQs regarding the HP and to address further economic aspects, the question of threatened fratricide and the moral superiority of the HP over all other proposed policy prescriptions. Until then Shabbat Shalom.