Are Turkey and Iran Teaming Up Against an Independent Kurdistan?

With the likely passage of the Kurdish Indpendence referendum st for September 25th, Tehran Times reported that “Major General Mohammad Bagheri, the chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, made a rare visit to Ankara where he met with his Turkish counterpart, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Turkey’s defense minister.”

Iran has continually pushed back against Kurdish Independence as has Turkey.  Both countries fear a free and independent Kurdistan will enable their large Kurdish populations to push for increased autonomy.  In Turey there are 20 million Kurds that live in second class conditions in Southeastern Turkey.  In Iran there are 15 million Kurds in the North West of the country.

“Holding the referendum is a natural and just right of the people of Kurdistan and no one other than the people of Kurdistan has the right to talk about it,” the Kurdish Peshmerga said in a statement released on Friday.

A rising Kurdistan will not only change the anatomy of the Middle East, but will thwart the hegemonic desires of both Turkey and Iran.

Although no one has declared armed conflict after the referendum, the threat is there.  The USA has even warned the Kurds not to go ahead just yet, but will not stop the vote. Given the large unknown factor after September 25th, most countries in the immediate vicinity are on edge.

Iran has accomplished a lot by subverting Iraq through its Shiite agents in Baghdad, but an overt move to Kurdish independence would roll back its advances and create a defacto Israeli ally on its borders. That would mean boh Kurdistan and Azerbaijan could give Israel an ability to take out Iran’s nuclear arsenal with ease.

This would mean that Israel could remain independent of the Saudi led Sunni alliance. This alone would weaken the leverage the Trump administration and the Saudis have in regard to Jewish biblical areas in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) deisired by the Arab world.

 

Is Putin Ready to Throw Iran Under the Bus?

The announcement that Prime Minister Netanyahu and Russia’s President Putin are set to meet this Wednesday the 23rd of August in the Russian resort city of Sochi doesn’t seem to stand out as significant.  Afterall, the two men meet every few months to prevent any friction between their countries.

So what makes this meeting so different?

In the span of time between the their last face to face meeting, President Donald Trump acquiesced to allow Russian armed observers to man the borders of Israel and Jordan.  This was under the guise of ensuring a ceasefire between the Syrian regime and rebel forces. Although there were some rocky first moments, the plan has brought a modicum of quiet to the areas in question.

The challenge for Israel has been what the Syrian Regime and Iran are using the “ceasefire” for. It has become clear that Iran and Syria are seeking near control of the Golan border area.  This they have accomplished by way of their Russian allies.

What’s Next for Iran and Russia?

The prevailing assumption has been that Putin would give Iran enough of a leash to clear out the rebels in Syria, but not enough for either Iran or Syria to be dominant in the Levant without the go ahead from Russia.  While it is important to understand that any overt alliance puts Israel’s security at risk, the now quarterly meetings between Bibi and Putin mitigated much of this. Of course, all of this depends on Putin holding Iran and Syria back from placing game changing forces on the Syrian side of the Golan.

Iran and Russia have a working understanding that Iran can do what is necessary to clear the rebels and ISIS out, but given Putin and Bibi’s deconfliction understandings anything else would be deemed an abrogation of the working agreement between Tehran and Moscow.  The ceasefire agreement between Trump and Putin made during the G20 Summit is a good test of this.  For the first time Russia would open a corridor for Iranian troops to move right up to the Golan, yet the actual movement of those troops negates the deconfliction strategy with Israel.

Up until now Russia has allowed the IAF to strike where it needs to against Iran. More than that, sources tell us that Putin even relays targeting information personally to Bibi.  Iran and Syria maybe allowed utilize the ceasefire to move troops to the Golan, but if the past is any kind of predictor then they are on their own.

While most pundits believe these sorts of actions will eventually spell the end of the Iranian-Russian Alliance this is more of the same for Putin.  He relishes in playing multiple sides of each other in order to effectively control the situation.

Reaffirming the Deconfliction Understandings and More…

Bibi’s trip to Moscow is more about reaffirming the deconlfiction understandings in light of the new reality of Russia’s troops now manning the Golan border. Russia has no interest in allowing Iran to attack Israel, which would fully destabilize the region.  Putin wants recognition by Israel that Russia is the new player in the Levant and that it Israel will have to reevaluate how it relates to the fast changing Middle East.

Putin will keep allowing Israel to attack Iranian and Syrian targets. In Putin’s grand strategy this keeps the region in balance while he continues to take more and more control.

As America continues to minimize its overt involvement in the Middle East, the vacuum created is leading to a new order with its strings more or less being pulled by Moscow.

Israel’s goal is to hold onto to its security independence while treading carefully though a new Middle East.

 

NETANYAHU’S GREAT CHALLENGE

What can Netanyahu do to mitigate the impact of the probes on his ability to do his job?

Over the weekend, it was reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu supports legislation that would change the procedure for declaring war. The bill, supported by the government as well as by Netanyahu’s opponent and former finance minister Yair Lapid, involves implementing lessons learned from past experiences.

Under the suggested law, the government will provide the security cabinet with blanket authority to authorize military operations at the beginning of its tenure. By limiting the number of people involved in decision making regarding actual operations, leaks can be minimized and the element of surprise can be protected.

Given the wide support the bill enjoys, and its substance, the media could have been expected to cover the move in a sober-minded way.

But alas, there was no chance of that happening amid the media circus surrounding the criminal probes of Netanyahu. The desultory probes were recently fortified by the deal Netanyahu’s former chief of staff Ari Harow cut with the prosecution to incriminate his former boss in exchange for leniency in the ongoing corruption probe of Harow’s alleged influence peddling.

Now, with Netanyahu’s sworn enemies in the media and the political Left braying for his immediate resignation, the war powers bill, like everything else he is likely to initiate in the coming months and years, is being reported as nothing more than an attempt to change the subject.

None of the probes are expected to conclude any time soon. Legal experts assess they will stretch well into 2019. This means Netanyahu will be under a cloud of suspicion at least until the end of his current term of office. And that is not good for the country.

So what can Netanyahu do to mitigate the impact of the probes on his ability to do his job? The answer is complicated. On the one hand, it is fairly clear that he won’t be able to do anything to end the probes and not because he is accused of doing terrible things. To the contrary, he is accused of doing ridiculously stupid and harmless things.

The police are conducting two investigations of the prime minister. In the first, they are investigating whether he received too many gifts from his friends. Specifically, they want to know if he received too many cigars from his friend Arnon Milchen and whether he received other presents from other friends.

The second probe relates to a deal he discussed but never made with his arch-nemesis Yediot Aharonot publisher Arnon Mozes under which Mozes would give less hostile coverage of Netanyahu and in exchange, Netanyahu would get Yediot’s pro-Netanyahu competitor Israel Hayom to cut back its circulation. In the event, the talks went nowhere. In 2014 Netanyahu broke up his government and went to early elections in 2015 to prevent a bill – supported by 24 lawmakers in a preliminary vote – which would have bankrupted Israel Hayom from moving forward.

The 24 lawmakers that supported the bill received terrific coverage in Yediot. But none of them – including former justice minister Tzipi Livni – are under investigation. The police’s lack of interest in Livni is particularly notable. She advanced the bill despite the fact that then attorney general Yehuda Weinstein determined it was unconstitutional. She based her decision on a legal opinion produced for her by Yediot’s attorney.

FINALLY, THE third investigation doesn’t involve Netanyahu at all. Instead his attorney, confidante and cousin David Shimron is under investigation. And according to investigative reporter Yoav Yitzhak, the probe unraveled this week when the state’s witness was shown to have lied either to police investigators or to his own attorneys about Shimron’s role in brokering a deal for Israel to buy new submarines from Germany.

Netanyahu supported the purchase, indeed, he touted it. His media foes allege that he only supported the purchase, which was opposed by the Defense Ministry, because Shimron was involved.

This allegation itself makes clear the absurdity of the probe.

If the investigation goes forward despite the collapse of the investigation, and Netanyahu is implicated, there is simply no way to prove that he supported the deal for corrupt reasons when he insists that he supported it because he believes Israel needs a modernized submarine fleet.

In other words, the third investigation is incapable of implicating Netanyahu regardless of its relative merits.

It is important to understand the inherent weakness of the probes because it shows us two important things. First, the investigators and the prosecutors do not care what the public thinks of their investigations. In a damning interview with the online Hebrew-language journal Mida last week, former police investigator chief superintendent Boaz Gutman confirmed the long alleged claim that police and prosecutors are motivated to investigate right-wing politicians rather than left-wing politicians because they want the Left restored to power.

As far as police investigators and prosecutors are concerned, it is they, rather than the public, that should decide who gets to lead Israel.

And this brings us to the second aspect we need to understand about the weakness of the probes. To date, politicized investigators and prosecutors have felt comfortable probing and indicting politicians for political reasons because since 1993, the mere act of indicting a politician has been the professional equivalent of a felony conviction.

In 1993, the activist Supreme Court ruled that then interior minister Arye Deri had to resign due to his recent indictment on corruption charges. The ruling, which had no basis in law, has since enjoyed the status of law. Politicians, who are later exonerated of all criminal charges, have repeatedly been forced from office, their reputations in tatters.

The power to remove politicians from office simply by indicting them gives the prosecution absolute power over the political system. The fear of indictment, perhaps more than anything else, has been sufficient to stop every significant attempt to pass laws to reform the unchecked legal system.

In recent weeks, coalition chairman MK David Bitan has told the media that Netanyahu has pledged not to resign if indicted in light of the trivial nature of the probes. Netanyahu’s ability to remain in his position, in opposition to the non-binding norm dictated by the Supreme Court in 1993, will be a function of the public’s view of him and of the investigations against him. And if Netanyahu is strong enough to stay, then his intention not to fold will have a salutary impact on the fairness of the investigations against him.

If the prosecutors realize they will have to win a case against a sitting prime minister rather than one they have already forced from office in disgrace, their decision about whether or not to indict Netanyahu will be based far more on the investigations’ findings and far less on their political views than in the past.

Although prosecutors do not care what the public thinks of them, they do care what their colleagues think of them. And if they indict a sitting prime minister and then fail to convict him while he is still in office and popular, their colleagues will not think well of them.

So it all boils down to governing. But how should Netanyahu govern? If Netanyahu follows the lead set by prime minister Ariel Sharon when he and his sons were under investigation, and abandons his political base to appease the Left, he will harm his chances of remaining in power. Netanyahu will become as unpopular as Ehud Olmert was when he was indicted. He will not avoid indictment. And he will not be reelected.

If on the other hand Netanyahu is loyal to his voters and implements the Right’s policy on Judea and Samaria – namely, applying Israeli law to Area C of Judea and Samaria in anticipation of the era that will begin when 82-year-old PLO chief Mahmoud Abbas dies – then he will not only be able to stay in office if indicted, he will win the next elections even if he is still enmeshed in criminal probes.

Originally published by the Jerusalem Post

Neo-unilateralism – Futile, fatal folly

New calls for unilateral withdrawal are both pernicious—because of the calamitous consequences it will precipitate—and puerile—because of the naïve hope that it will not

 

I can even pin dates on it. In 2007 or 2008 we will have another major disengagement in the West Bank. And within a decade, we will unilaterally repartition Jerusalem along lines we will unilaterally select … What Israelis have understood – and this is the underlying feature of the disengagement – is that we need to leave Gaza and Nablus, not because it will bring peace, but because there will be perpetual terror…

Dan Schueftan, then one of the principle advocates for the 2005 unilateral evacuation from Gaza, predicting it would be only a first step in a “wider historical process” of further unilateral Israeli withdrawals, The Jerusalem Report, September 2005.

 

…it [unilateral withdrawal] promises no solution, no peace, no regional or international legitimacy, no alleviation of hostility, no end to terrorism, not even a respite [and] threatens to tear political and social systems apart…-Dan Schueftan, today director of the National Security Studies Center, University of Haifa, on the impact of unilateral withdrawal from Judea-Samaria, which he urges Israel to adopt(!), in Tablet Magazine, August 8, 2017

 

The proposal for (re)adoption of unilateral withdrawal—this time from Judea-Samaria—began to emerge in the public discourse over four years ago.

 

Foreseeable fatal flaws

Since then, I have warned, insistently and incessantly, of the glaring defects in the rationale of this resurgent  recipe for  foretold failure– see:  The coming canard: ‘Constructive unilateralism’Stupendously stupid or surreptitiously sinister; Infuriating, insidious, immoral; Imbecility squared – Part 1;  Imbecility squared- Part 2;  Generals, gimmicks and gobbledygook.

 

Yet despite its clearly discernible flaws, which virtually ensure disaster if it were to be (re)adopted, this  ill-conceived idea not only remains stubbornly on the national agenda, but—almost inconceivably—is gaining increasing support from an alarming number of well-funded organizations and influential individuals.

 

It is, in many ways, the flagship project of the well-endowed Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). It is also championed by what is effectively INSS’s public advocacy arm, Blue and White Future. Likewise, it is endorsed by  Commanders for Israel Security (CIS) an organization reportedly comprising over 200   former high-ranking officers in the IDF, intelligence services and police. 

 

Not ad hominem attack

 

The most recent call for “unilateral disengagement from the overwhelming majority of the West Bankand massive rooting-out of Jewish populations” comes from none other than the Director of the National Security Studies Center, University of Haifa, Dr. Dan Schueftan.

 

In a rambling essay, over 3000 words long, in Tablet Magazine, replete with internal contradictions and riddled with non-sequiturs, Schueftan sets out his “rationale” (for want of a better word) for Israel to adopt a policy, which, in his own words, “promises no solution, no peace, no regional or international legitimacy, no alleviation of hostility, no end to terrorism, not even a respite[and]threatens to tear political and social systems apart…”

 

Although I shall have decidedly harsh criticism of Schueftan’s policy prescriptions, I should like to make it clear: This is not an ad hominem attack on the author, but a resolute repudiation of his ideas.

 

I have been acquainted with Schueftan for years, and have found him to be a very affable individual, a learned scholar and a gifted—albeit not always the most genteel—orator. However, as someone who holds a prestigious position in academe and is responsible for molding the strategic perspective of a large number of students, the doctrines he expounds cannot go un-scrutinized, and, if found defective, unchallenged.  

 

The fact that he may genuinely believe that what he is proposing is in the national interest should not shield him from censure if it can be plausibly demonstrated that it will precipitate precisely the opposite.

 

Pernicious puerile prescription

 

All the proposals of the various proponents of renewed unilateral withdrawal embrace the same principle–with only shades of nuance differentiating between them.

 

This involves Israel’s forswearing all sovereign claims to any territory beyond a line that approximates the route of the current security barrier and acting to remove Israeli civilian presence from this territory. In light of the disastrous results similar measures produced in Gaza, “neo-unilateralists” attempt to assuage public concern by stipulating that the IDF will remain deployed in the areas over which Israel eschews sovereignty.

 

Thus, CIS proposes that IDF deployment will continue until the emergence of “a permanent status agreement with the Palestinians [which] ushers in alternative concrete, sustainable security arrangements.” Closely mirroring this idea, Schueftan, peppering his concessionary prescription with machoistic rhetoric, suggests: “…the mainstream majority can be expected to consider a unilateral move positively if they know that the IDF will remain in overall charge of security, unless a dependable Arab army replaces it, if and when Israel sees fit”.

 

This of course is a prescription that is, at once, pernicious—because of the predictably calamitous consequences it will precipitate—and puerile—because of the naïve hope that it will not…

 

Entrapping the IDF in open-ended occupation

 

Inevitably, the proposal for ongoing deployment of the Israeli military in territory over which Israel makes no sovereign claims would, in a stroke, convert Judea-Samaria from “disputed territory” to “occupied territory” and the IDF from a “defense force” to an “occupying force”. Worse, it would do so by explicit admission from Israel itself!

 

Moreover, by conditioning the end of IDF deployment on the emergence of “alternative concrete, sustainable security arrangements” or in Schueftan’s words, leaving the IDF in overall charge of security, unless a dependable Arab army replaces it, if and when Israel sees fit”, the neo-unilateralists are, in fact, promoting a formula for open-ended occupation, whose duration is totally dependent on the Palestinian-Arabs.

 

After all, if the IDF is to remain deployed in the “West Bank” until some “dependable” Palestinian counterpart appears, sufficiently pliant to satisfy Israel’s demands, but sufficiently robust to resist more radical domestic rivals that oppose those demands, what happens if such a counterpart fails to emerge?

 

Clearly then, all the Palestinian-Arabs need to do to ensnare the IDF in what will inevitably become an increasingly unpopular “occupation”, making  it an easy target for guerilla attacks by a recalcitrant population, backed by armed Palestinian internal security services, is…well, nothing. 

 

All they need to do is wait until mounting IDF casualties in a “foreign land” create increasing domestic pressure to “bring our boys back home”, and mounting international  impatience with unending “occupation” create growing external pressure, which will make continued IDF deployment untenable. Withdrawal will then become  inevitable, without any “permanent settlement” or “sustainable security arrangements”.

 

Unsustainable strategy

 

Schueftan is caustically critical of Palestinian society in Judea-Samaria, characterizing it as “a profoundly irresponsible society [with] elites who are unwilling to engage in constructive nation-building [who] prefer to glorify and finance terrorists and perpetuate narratives of unlimited grievance vis-à-vis the Jewish state”.

 

So even in the unlikely event that some Palestinian-Arab partner could be located, who would, in good faith, agree to conclude a permanent status agreement and implement acceptable security arrangements allowing the IDF to evacuate Judea-Samaria, how could Israel ensure this agreement will be honored and these arrangements maintained over time?

 

Clearly it could not!  

Once the IDF withdraws, Israel has no way of preventing its Palestinian co-signatories from reneging on their commitments—whether of their own volition, due to a change of heart, or under duress from extremist adversaries.

 

Even more to the point, barring intimate involvement in intra-Palestinian politics, Israel has no way to ensure that their pliant partner will not be replaced—whether by bullet or ballot—by far more inimical successors, probably  generously supported by foreign regimes, who repudiate their predecessors’ pledges. Indeed, it is more than likely that it would be precisely the “perfidious” deal struck with the “nefarious Zionist entity” that would be invoked as justification for the regime-change.  

 

Certainly,  given Schueftan’s own uncomplimentary description of Palestinian society such an outcome can hardly be dismissed as implausible

 

What is the neo-unilateralist’s “Plan B”?

 

Accordingly, no matter which of these outcomes—a change of heart or a change of regime—emerges in practice, Israel is likely to be confronted with a situation where it no longer has security control in Judea-Samaria and a hostile regime perched on the hills dominating the coastal megalopolis—overlooking its only international airport, adjacent to its major population centers and abutting principal transportation axes.

 

It would be intriguing to learn what neo-unilateralists, such as Schueftan, propose as their “Plan B”, should the realities precipitated in the South  following unilateral withdrawal, emerge along  Israel’s eastern border.  Clearly anything approaching those realities on the fringes of Greater Tel Aviv would make the maintenance of any socio-economic routine impossible—since it could be disrupted at will by hostile forces, renegade or regular, deployed on the commanding highlands evacuated by the IDF.

 

So how would Schueftan and his fellow neo-unilateralists recommend responding? A massive punitive attack along a 500 km front, with difficult terrain and inevitable   “collateral damage”, likely to dwarf anything incurred in previous campaigns such as “Protective Edge”? And to what end? To withdraw once again behind the security barrier? Or to withdraw and repeat the same “experiment”, hoping for more fortuitous results next time? Or the time after that?

  

Touting a giant South Lebanon on fringes of Tel Aviv

 

Of course, the basic elements of the new unilateralism— forswearing of claims to sovereignty over Judea-Samaria, on the one hand; and continued deployment of the IDF in that territory, on the other—replicate precisely the same conditions that prevailed in South Lebanon until the IDF’s hasty retreat in 2000.

 

Clearly, under these conditions, any hope that the conflict can be officially resolved with some negotiated final-status agreement is hopelessly detached from reality. After all, why should the Palestinians offer any quid pro quo to negotiate the withdrawal of the IDF when Israel has a-priori conceded sovereignty to them and ceased all civilian construction, condemning the settlements to inevitable decay and disintegration?

 

Moreover, what would be the justification for continued IDF deployment in the sovereign territory of others—especially as that deployment itself is likely to be cited as the major grievance sustaining the belligerency between the sides?

 

Accordingly, proposals for deploying the IDF for an indeterminate period, in territory over which it lays no sovereign claim—and hence, by implication, acknowledges that others have such claims to it—will create an unsustainable political configuration, which, sooner or later, will generate irresistible pressure on Israel to withdraw—just as it did in Lebanon—leaving the country exposed to the very dangers the IDF deployment was intended to obviate.   

 

Futile folly

 

As mentioned, Schueftan concedes that his prescribed unilateralism “promises no solution, no peace, no regional or international legitimacy, no alleviation of hostility, no end to terrorism… Accordingly, he asks: “why embark on an extremely painful process” which, by his own admission will traumatize “hundreds of thousands of Israelis…and threaten to tear…Israeli society apart.”

 

His answer, in a nutshell , is that it will, allegedly, free Israel from the burden of “dominating and caring for them [the Palestinian-Arabs] for over half a century” which is precisely what we were told about unilateral disengagement from Gaza –which is still, a decade later, critically dependent on Israel for a wide range of goods and services.

 

Of course, to believe that Schueftan’s prescription will achieve such freedom is a futile and forlorn hope. Indeed, the very fact that the IDF is to remain deployed in Judea-Samaria with overriding authority for security, will impose very similar burdens and responsibilities to those it bears today.  It will need to exert authority over local law enforcement organizations, and perhaps countermand any decisions they make if considered detrimental to Israel’s security. It will have to regulate and inspect a wide range of civilian activities, such as the management of dangerous industrial pollutants, sewage flows into Israel, and the inspection of usage of dual purpose material like steel, fertilizers and cement to ensure that are not diverted to manufacture weapons or tunnels…

 

And I have only begun to scratch the surface…

 

Epilogue

 

In February 2004, prior to the Gaza Disengagement, Schueftan, gave an interview to “New York Magazine”, where he was billed as “the highly regarded Israeli analyst and academic whose concept of unilateral disengagement now dominates debate in Israel”. In it  he proclaimed: The Israeli public wants to be completely cut off from the Palestinians, and as a result nobody can be prime minister without going in this direction. It’s not even an option if they want to stay in power.”

 

Of course, since then, Benjamin Netanyahu seems to have disregarded Schueftan counsel–only to become the longest serving prime minister in decades…which might be a good indicator of merit with which Schueftan’s prognoses/prescriptions should be credited…

 

Our Moral Hypocrites

There was recently a “feel good” story in Israel that didn’t make me feel so good. I’ll explain why.  An Iranian female blogger for the Times of Israel (a publication I hold in very low esteem) living in Turkey believed herself to be in danger of being deported from Turkey back to Iran. There was fear that she could face punishment in her native Iran for her Israeli connections and possibly even the death penalty. (link – https://worldisraelnews.com/iranian-journalist-granted-refuge-in-israel-lands-in-tel-aviv/)
As a result of this potential life-endangering scenario, the Ultra-Orthodox Israeli Minister of the Interior Aryeh Deri granted the non-Jewish woman asylum in Israel. After some Turkish imposed delays, she arrived safely in Israel.
While I don’t know for sure how likely any of this actually was, including the death penalty part, I think I’m in the solid majority of opinion that its better to be safe than sorry in such cases and it was right of the Israeli Government to act as they did. Despite this, I am left with a bad feeling. Why?
Another story also came out this week (link: http://www.jewishpress.com/news/eye-on-palestine/palestinian-authority/report-israeli-police-collaborated-with-pa-agents-in-interrogating-arab-who-sold-hebron-building-to-jews/2017/08/04/) about a non-Jew who had contacts with Israeli Jews and faces a potential death penalty. But this story is much worse and, so far, doesn’t end as nicely. In this case, the arab sold properties to Jews in Hevron, a capital crime under the Palestinian Authority (PA) for which other offenders have been executed in the past. He is now being held in confinement by the PA in Hevron. Not only is Israel not helping him, according to reports they are actually actively incriminating him. And he’s not the only arab being held in Hevron for the “crime” of selling land to a Jew. Where is his asylum and that of others?
I have no problem rescuing a politically irrelevant blogger in Turkey, but woudn’t it be more moral and strategic to rescue the very relevant and very endangered arab(s) in Hevron?  I don’t expect the Times of Israel to take up their cause, but I think we should expect faithful Jews to do so.