IN THIS ROUND OF RECONCILIATION TALKS, HAMAS IS THE GREAT VICTOR

Fatah’s surrender to Hamas.

On Tuesday, a delegation of 400 Fatah officials from Ramallah, led by Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah, arrived in Gaza to officially surrender to Hamas.

No, the ceremony isn’t being portrayed as a Fatah surrender to Hamas. But it is. It’s also an Egyptian surrender to Hamas.

How is this the case? Ten years ago this past June, after a very brief and deadly assault by Hamas terrorists against US-trained Fatah forces in Gaza, the Fatah forces cut and ran to Israel for protection. Fatah politicians also headed for the border and then scurried into Fatah-controlled (and Israeli protected) Ramallah. Ever since, Hamas has served as the official authority on the ground in Gaza. Its personnel have been responsible for internal security and for Gaza’s borders with Egypt and Israel.

Despite their humiliating defeat and removal from Gaza, Fatah and its PA government in Ramallah continued to fund Hamas-controlled Gaza. They paid Gaza’s bills, including the salaries of all the PA security forces that were either no longer working or working double shifts as stay at home Fatah gunmen and up and coming Hamas terrorist forces.

The PA paid Hamas’s electricity bills to Israel and it paid Israeli hospitals which continued to serve Gaza.

Internationally, the PA defended Hamas and its constant wars against Israel. The PA and Fatah, led by President-for-life Mahmoud Abbas, continued to use Israel’s defensive operations against Hamas as a means to ratchet up their political war against Israel. The latest victory in that war came last week with Interpol’s decision to permit the PA to join the organization despite its open support for and finance of terrorism.

For most of the past decade, the PA-Fatah has allocated more than half of its EU- and US-underwritten budget to Hamas-controlled Gaza. It has defended its actions to successive delegations of US lawmakers and three US administrations. It has defended its actions to EU watchdog groups. No amount of congressional pressure or statements from presidential envoys ever made a dent on Abbas’s strident devotion to paying the salaries of Hamas terrorists and functionaries.

But then, in April, Abbas cut them off.

Ostensibly he cut them off because he was under pressure from the US Congress, which is now in the end stages of passing the Taylor Force Act. Once passed, the law will make it a bit more difficult for the State Department to continue funding the terror- financing PA.

While the Taylor Force Act is the ostensible reason for Abbas’s move, Palestinian sources openly acknowledge that congressional pressure had nothing to do with his decision.

Abbas abruptly ended PA financing of Hamas in retaliation for Hamas’s decision to open relations with Abbas’s archrival in Fatah, Muhammad Dahlan.

From 1994, when the PA was established, until 2007, when Hamas ousted his US-trained forces from Gaza, Dahlan was the Gaza strongman.

Once one of Abbas’s closest cronies, since 2011 Dahlan has been his archenemy. Abbas, now in the twelfth year of his four-year term in office, views Dahlan as the primary threat to his continued reign.

As a consequence, he ousted Dahlan from Fatah and forced him to decamp with his sizable retinue to the UAE. There Dahlan enjoys exceedingly close ties with the Nahyan regime.

The UAE is allied with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Sisi. Both view Hamas’s mother organization the Muslim Brotherhood as their mortal foe. As a result, Sisi and the UAE as well as Saudi Arabia sided with Israel in its 2014 war with Hamas.

Since May, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have been in open conflict with Qatar. Qatar, which sponsors the Muslim Brotherhood, has long sponsored Hamas as well.

Since the start of the year, the UAE has been interested in prying Hamas away from Qatar. And so with the blessing of his UAE hosts, Dahlan began building ties with Hamas.

Recognizing Dahlan’s close ties to the UAE and through it, with Sisi, Hamas, which has been stricken by Sisi’s war against it, and particularly Sisi’s enforcement of the closure of Gaza’s border with Egypt’s Sinai, was quick to seize on Dahlan’s initiative.

The talks between Dahlan and Sisi on the one hand and Hamas on the other were ratcheted up in April after Abbas cut his funding to Gaza.

In May, Hamas formally cut its ties with the Muslim Brotherhood.

In exchange, Sisi permitted the Rafah border crossing with Gaza to open for longer hours and permitted Gazans to transit Egypt en route to their religious pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, among other things.

To build its leverage against Abbas, beginning in the spring, Hamas began describing Dahlan as a viable alternative to Abbas. The UAE agreed to begin financing Hamas’s budget and to help pay for electricity.

Against this backdrop, it is self-evident that Abbas didn’t send his own representatives to Cairo to negotiate a surrender deal with Hamas because his aid cut-off brought Hamas to its knees. Abbas sent his people to Cairo because Hamas’s double dealing with Dahlan brought Abbas to his knees.

As for Sisi, Hamas has also played him – and the UAE.

Over the past few months, Hamas has been rebuilding its client relationship with Iran. A senior Hamas delegation visited Tehran last month for Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s swearing-in ceremony.

They met there with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and with senior Revolutionary Guards commanders.

A month earlier, senior Hamas terrorist Salah Arouri, who lives under Hezbollah protection in Beirut, paved the way for the reconciliation in a meeting under Hezbollah sponsorship with senior Revolutionary Guards commander Amir Abdollahian.

Following the meeting in Tehran, Hamas leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar extolled Hamas’s relations with Iran as “fantastic.” Sinwar also said that Iran is “the largest backer financially and militarily” of Hamas’s terrorism apparatus.

Concerned about Tehran’s growing influence in Gaza, and through it, the Sinai, where Sisi continues to fight against an Islamic State-backed insurgency, Sisi has an interest in tempering Hamas’s client-ties to Tehran.

So just as Abbas has decided to restore financing to Hamas to keep Dahlan at bay, so Sisi has decided to embrace Hamas to keep Iran at bay.

In all cases, of course, Hamas wins.

The fact that Hamas has just won is obvious when we consider the unity deal it just concluded with Fatah.

Hamas made one concession. It agreed to break up its civil governing authority – a body it formed in response to Abbas’s decision to cut off funding in April. In exchange for agreeing to disband a body it only formed because Abbas cut off its funding, Hamas receives a full restoration of PA funding. The PA will fund all civil service operations in Gaza. It will pay the salaries of all civil servants and security personnel in Gaza. It will pay salaries to all Hamas terrorists Israel freed from its jails.

In other words, the PA will now be responsible for keeping the lights on and picking up the garbage.

And Hamas will be free to concentrate on preparing for and initiating its next terror war against Israel. It can dig tunnels. It can build missiles. It can expand its operational ties with Hezbollah, Islamic State, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and Fatah.

In the wake of Hamas’s leadership’s meetings in Tehran, Sinwar told reporters that Hamas is now moving full speed ahead toward doing all of these things. Sinwar said that Hamas is “developing our military strength in order to liberate Palestine.” He added, “Every day we build missiles and continue military training.”

Thousands of people, he said, are working “day and night” to prepare Hamas’s next terror war against Israel. And indeed, two weeks ago, two Hamas terrorists were killed when the tunnels they were digging collapsed on them.

Tuesday’s surrender ceremonies tell us two things.

First, the notion that Fatah is even remotely interested in defeating Hamas is complete nonsense. For 10 years since its forces were humiliated and routed in Gaza, Fatah has faithfully funded and defended Hamas. Abbas’s only concern is staying in charge of his Israeli-protected fiefdom in Ramallah. To this end, he will finance – with US and EU taxpayer monies – and defend another 10 Hamas wars with Israel.

The second lesson we learn from Hamas’s victory is that we need to curb our enthusiasm for Sisi and his regime in Egypt, and for his backers in the UAE. Sisi’s decision to facilitate and mediate Hamas’s newest victory over Fatah shows that his alliance with Israel is tactical and limited in scope. His decision to side with Israel against Hamas during Operation Protective Edge three years ago may not repeat itself in the next war.

Originally published by the Jerusalem Post

Change is Coming to Jordan Whether the King Likes It or Not

Despite Israel’s desire to protect the Hashemite regime, and stay out of messy Arab internal politics, it is now public knowledge that the Israeli intelligence establishment believes that Jordan’s king’s fall is imminent, and Israeli officials have been whispering that in private for a while, desperately discussing ways to save king and keep him in power. Nonetheless, a well-calculated, carefully-ushered and engineered change in Jordan could pose a huge opportunity for US, Israel, our Jordanian people, and all of those who want peace.

No, we’re not seeking a total regime change in Jordan, in which the state itself is turned into nothingness, leaving a gap for Islamists to jump in and take over. That was Obama’s style at best, because Obama did not know better, or at worst, because he wanted the Islamists to take over.

The change we desire for Jordan will be simple: Seeing the already irrelevant king leave by a small and peaceful revolution that is protected by the army. The US does not and need not interfere, this will be an internal Jordanian affair. All the US should do is offer the king a safe exit while Jordan’s army and strong intelligence keep the country intact and the Islamists at bay. This was the case when Egyptians took to the streets against the Muslim Brotherhood, deposed Morsi and the army protected the people, and the outcome: Serendipity, and more secular and peaceful Egypt, under a strong and wonderful man, President Sisi. Worth-noting here, that Jordan’s king does not control the army or Jordan’s intelligence; therefore, he will leave in peace, the US, on the other hand, finances, trains and influences our army and intelligence and could help both secular and patriotic organizations to usher in a moderate interim government for Jordan.

The US and the region could obtain breakthrough advantages from change in Jordan. The first is destroying Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood. (MB). Jordan’s MB gets its power from the regime – so if the regime falls, the MB falls. Jordan’s own government believes this. This is important because Jordan’s MB is not just another terror group. The global MB HQ is based in Amman and controls Hamas and the global MB as well, especially Qatar’s. The US intelligence agencies are aware of this fact. If Jordan’s army -under US help and guidance- ushers in a secular anti-MB leader (like Egypt’s Sisi), that would be a major blow to the MB and the Western globalists forces who support them such as Soros.

The second advantage is ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; if a Palestinian-Jordanian leader becomes the head of Jordan’s interim government, and then Jordan’s president; this means that Jordanians from all backgrounds will have a home, and that 2.1 million Palestinians in Israel, all holding Jordanian passports, could find a place to call their state.

Next, once the king is out and his theft of public money stops, Jordan will become economically prosperous and attractive for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank itself. Meanwhile, Israel and the US should continue to apply pressure on the corrupt and terroristic Palestinian Authority, gradually putting them out of the business of killing our people, Israelis, and even other PLO figures. Defusing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be major blow to the globalists who have blackmailed the world for decades with it, and who remain united against President Trump and his advisor, Jared Kushner’s, effort to usher in real peace.

Another advantage is that a successful regime change in Jordan will put the region’s radical regimes on notice, Qatar for example. Those will need to end their hostility to Israel and to stop promoting radical Islamism, otherwise face the same music King Abdullah has. This also shall empower moderate regimes, and champions of change, such as the very pragmatic Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Ben Salman, and UAE’s Crown Prince, Mohammad Ben Zayed.

America’s deep and positive influence of Jordan’s army and security agencies means the country will remain safe during the transition, and so will its borders with Israel. In fact, it is this influence that keeps Jordan’s borders with Israel safe, and not the absentee landlord king who spends most of his time in Europe, with documented travel of 30 percent of the year, not counting his year-long private vacations. Basically, he is irrelevant to everything and anything in Jordan.

One a new interim leadership is in power, the first thing it should do is banning all Islamist groups, just like Sisi of Egypt did, and this will mean they won’t even have a chance of running for any public office, let alone for president.

Today, such positive change in Jordan will be embraced by several Arab governments who no-longer see Israel as an enemy and in fact would love to see an end to the expensive and obstructive conflict.

This sought change is the very reason my political party and I are proudly taking part in the Jordan Option Conference in Jerusalem in October.

The sweet music of change is playing loud, and we all better be listening.

The Smotrich Plan – A step in the right direction, but…

Several flaws in MK Smotrich’s otherwise bold proposal will prevent it from achieving its long-term strategic goal: Sustainable Jewish sovereignty over the entire Land of Israel

… I am not talking here about cruel expulsion or the flooding of countries with penniless refugees. The emigration we are talking about is planned, willing, and based on a desire for a better life, by people with appropriate skills for their new country of absorption and the economic ability to make the change. This is not migration on rickety boats, but the very modern phenomenon of organized relocation to countries which provide an opportunity for a better future…

MK Bezalel Smotrich, Deputy Speaker of the Knesset, “Israel’s Decisive Plan”, Sept. 7, 2017.

Over the last week or so, the idea of funded emigration as a means of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict got a considerable fillip.

Boosting funded emigration in media

The impetus for this media flurry was a 30 page essay in the relatively new journal of political philosophy and policy, “Hashiolach”, written by MK Bezalel Smotrich, of the National Union faction in the Jewish Home party—which has three senior ministers in the ruling coalition: Education, Justice, and Agriculture.

In principle, Smotrich’s plan calls for abandoning the two-state endeavor, dismantling the Palestinian Authority and extending Israeli sovereignty over all of Judea-Samaria.

As for the Arab population in this area, Smotrich distinguishes between those who are willing “to forgo their national aspirations” and to reconcile themselves to living under Israeli sovereignty—and those who are not.

With regard to the latter category, Smotrich again distinguishes between two groups—those who will continue to fight against Israeli sovereignty, and those who will not. With regard to the former, he calls for harsh coercive action—far harsher than employed today—to quash any recalcitrant resistance.  With regard to the latter—i.e. “those who choose not to let go of their national ambitions” but eschew active resistance against Israel—will “receive aid to emigrate to one of the many countries where Arabs realize their national ambitions, or to any other destination in the world”.

Funded emigration: Breaking the taboo?

The essay drew considerable media attention and was widely reported in both the Hebrew and the English press.  

On Tuesday, a conference convened by the National Union faction, reportedly attended by “hundreds” (up to 800 by one account), unanimously approved the proposal. While the short-term political significance of this is unclear, one thing does appear to emerge. The debate on financially incentivized emigration of the Palestinian-Arabs is edging inexorably into the mainstream discourse as a legitimate topic for discussion.

Indeed, underscoring this emerging legitimization was the fact that despite it being known that funded emigration would be the central topic at the conference, Prime Minister Netanyahu sent a message congratulating the participants on dedicating the discussions at this conference to the future of the Land of Israel״ and assuring them—pointedly—that We are building the land and we are settling it. In the mountains, in the valleys, in the Galilee, in the Negev, and yes, in Judea and Samaria as well”.

Very much in the spirit of the sentiments expressed in Smotrich’s essay, he added: “Because this is our land. The homeland of the Jewish people. The only land promised to our forefathers. We were given the right to settle here.

While it would be imprudent to read too much into this, it would not be entirely implausible to conclude that some of the taboo attached to raising the issue of funded emigration of the Palestinian-Arabs in “polite company” may finally be beginning to dissipate.

Step in the right direction, but…

Of course, there is little new in the idea of funded emigration. Indeed, I have been urging its adoption as the center piece of Israeli policy for well over a decade.  Likewise, so has former deputy Knesset speaker, Moshe Feiglin.

Accordingly, any enterprise fostering public debate on the principle, especially as an alternative to the pernicious prescription for “two-states”, is a positive development.  In this regard, Smotrich’s initiative is to be applauded as a welcome step in the right (pardon the pun) direction.

Indeed, as I have pointed out, almost ad nauseum, there is no other policy paradigm that can enable Israel to adequately contend with the twin imperatives—the geographic and demographic—which it needs to deal with to ensure its long-term viability as the nation-state of the Jewish people. The need to effectively address these imperatives should be virtually self–evident for if they are not, Israel, as the nation state of the Jews, will become untenable—either geographically or demographically. Or both!

Clearly, there is no other non-coercive—or at least non-kinetic (i.e. involving large-scale-violence)—that can produce an outcome in which   Israel retains (a) control of the  strategically vital territory, abutting and overlooking virtually all its major population centers and vital infrastructure systems; and (b) a sufficiently dominant  Jewish population in the territory under its control, so as to preserve the Jewish character of the state.

Regrettably, however, as it is formulated, Smotrich’s proposal is marred by several flaws that not only impair its logical consistency and political acceptability, but will prevent it from achieving its long-term strategic goal: Sustainable Jewish sovereignty over the Land of Israel from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.

Good intentions, fatal flaws

To his credit, Smotrich gets many things right in his proposal. He is certainly correct in his withering criticism of the two-state approach and in perceptively diagnosing that, by its formal endorsement of this approach, Israel necessarily makes itself appear disingenuous—since it cannot take  the actions required to implement its declared intentions without putting its citizens at unacceptable risk.  

However, the only litmus test Smotrich seems to apply for permitting the Arab residents of Judea-Samaria to continue to live under Jewish sovereignty is a professed readiness “to forgo their national aspirations”.  

He writes: “Those who wish to forgo their national aspirations can stay here and live as individuals in the Jewish State; they will of course enjoy all the benefits that the Jewish State has brought and is bringing to the Land of Israel.”  

Sadly, this is sufficient to guarantee the eventual and inevitable failure of his plan—especially when this is coupled with his declared intention to permanently—or at least indefinitely—disenfranchise these Arabs. Thus, although he would grant them “the right to vote in municipal administrations which control their daily lives”, Smotrich writes “… the Arabs of Judea and Samaria will be able to conduct their daily life in freedom and peace, but not to vote for the Israeli Knesset”.

By this, Smotrich, in effect relegates his alleged innovative blueprint to a regurgitated version of the failed autonomy plan of the late 1970s—with the addendum of possible  funded emigration for those  unwilling to forgo their national aspirations” but unwilling to take up arms to achieve them.

Long-term irrelevance of initial “electoral arithmetic”

Smotrich endeavors to justify the rationale for this suggestion by contending that: “This will preserve the Jewish majority in decision making in the State of Israel”. While this claim might be numerically true – it is politically irrelevant, even detrimental.  

Indeed, even setting aside the clear possibility of purposeful subterfuge on the part of those Arabs professing “to forgo their national aspirations” Smotrich’s proposed measures comprised an unvarnished formula for institutionalized disenfranchisement of ostensibly non-belligerent residents, based on nothing more than ethnic affiliation—i.e. apartheid—making it a manifestly untenable political doctrine.

Moreover, by allowing Arab residents the prospect of “enjoy[ing] all the benefits that the Jewish State has brought and is bringing to the Land of Israel” in exchange for formally forswearing national aspirations, Smotrich, greatly undercuts the potential efficacy of his funded emigration option. Indeed, he severely limits the likelihood that anyone other than those showing a commendable, but arguably rare, combination of intellectual honesty, ideological fervor and a commitment to non-violence, will avail themselves of it!

But more important—as I have frequently been at pains to point out—the initial electoral arithmetic, while in itself a factor of significance, is not the only crucial issue in ensuring the overall Jewish nature of Israel over time. No less important, arguably more so, is the impact the permanent presence a large Muslim population (even if not a majority)  will have on the socio-cultural fabric of the nation—irrespective of who wins the elections.

Irrelevance of initial electoral arithmetic (cont.)

Accordingly, unless draconian restrictions are imposed on the disenfranchised Arab residents of sovereign Israel, on their freedom of movement and/or choice of abode, their presence will impact every walk of life in the country—in the shopping malls, on the beaches, on gender equality, on sexual preferences, on the consumption of alcohol, on the forms of public leisure activities…to name but a few.  For anyone who would doubt  the ominous nature of this prospect, or  attempt to dismiss it as baseless racially motivated scaremongering,  may I suggest a  brief—but sobering—look at what has befallen societies in Western Europe and Scandinavia, who have, in good faith, tried to incorporate far smaller Muslim populations—enfranchised or not—into their  domestic  socio-cultural milieu…

Moreover, as the Israeli government will be largely responsible for the newly acquired permanent, but disenfranchised, Arab population, huge budgetary resources will have to be diverted from current uses to closing the yawning socio-economic gaps that exist between the two sides of the pre-1967 Green Line—inevitably dramatically degrading the level of services currently provided in health, education, and transport as well as in the maintenance and development of national infrastructures.   

Clearly, none of this is likely to make Israel a more inviting abode for Jews abroad, nor an attractive location for retaining significant segments of the Jewish population currently resident here.  Indeed, it is likely to have a chilling effect on Jewish immigration (Aliyah) and a stimulating one on Jewish emigration (Yeridah), potentially upsetting any optimistic demographic assessments.

Accordingly, without some clear mechanism as to how such indeterminate disenfranchisement is to be addressed and eliminated, Israel is likely to face an unenviable position of a growing segment of the population, stripped indefinitely of political rights and largely alienated—perhaps even latently hostile—to the defining Jewish nature of the state in which they reside.  Hardly a formula that bodes well for the future!

Forgoing national aspirations: The danger of shifting sentiments

But perhaps one of the gravest problems with Smotrich’s criterion for offering the Palestinian-Arabs permanent residency under extended Israeli sovereignty—i.e. professed forgoing of national aspirations—is the implied assumption that this will be not only be  sincere, but long-lasting.  This is clearly—to be charitable—a tenuous supposition to base such a far-reaching strategic measure.  For even if one accepts that such aspirations are initially forsworn in good faith, there is—and cannot be—any assurance that this will not change for a myriad of reasons—from changes in personal circumstances, through outside incitement, to derision from one’s children. Indeed, even if such willingness to forgo national aspiration proves durable with the current generation—how can it be guaranteed that similar compliance will be undertaken by the younger generation?

Accordingly, Smotrich’s formula is more likely than not to have two detrimental results.

Firstly, relatively few Palestinian-Arabs are likely to avail themselves of the funded emigration option—because of his invitation for them “enjoy all the benefits that the Jewish State has brought and is bringing to the Land of Israel.”  Then at a later stage, Israel might find itself with a permanent Palestinian-Arab population, no longer willing to forgo their national aspirations, greatly empowered having enjoyed “all the benefits the Jewish State brought them”…and  now “chafing at the bit” to take it over.

What must be done…

Funded emigration is an essential policy tool for Israel, but for it to be effectively wielded it must be incorporated into a strategy that correctly conceptualizes the conflict between Jew and Arab as a conflict between irreconcilable collectives, from which only one can emerge victorious.

Its goal must be a drastic reduction of the Arab presence in sovereign Israel, not as Smotrich suggests, a conditioned maintenance thereof. It must comprise a system of enticing incentives to leave and punishing disincentives for staying   —not, as Smotrich suggests, incentivizing benefits for those remaining in the Jewish state.

Finally, while it must differentiate between a belligerent enemy collective and non-belligerent individuals who may be members of it,  the only binding proof of such non-belligerency must be acceptance of the funding for irreversible relocation.

Only then will the concept of funded emigration be able to fulfill its required role i.e. safeguarding the existence of the Jewish nation-state…and enhancing the future of non-belligerent Palestinian-Arabs.

Amichai, Replacement Community for Amona Receives Funding From the Government

In blow after blow to the assumption that Arab “Palestine” will replace Judea and Samaria as an independent state, the Israeli cabinet approved the budget for the first Jewish community to be built in Judea and Samaria in the last 25 years.

Amichai is the replacement community offered to the evacuees of Amona in order for their community to leave their homes quietly.  Amichai will be built next to Shilo, the site of the Biblical Tabernacle, and religious center for Israel until King David established Jerusalem.

Amichai Israel
Amichai, just East of Shilo marked in blue

With the Trump administration seemingly not interested in getting involved with internal Israeli matters, the Netanyahu government has been laying the groundwork for establishing some sort of extended Israeli sovereignty in Judea and Samaria.

Last week, the government upgraded the status of Jewish Hebron to a municipal council at the same time Netanyahu stated clearly that “Israel will remain in Judea and Samaria forever.” With Amichai going forward and 300 more homes to be built in Bet El, the unfolding strategy does not involve Palestine or at least not Palestine located on Israel’s Biblical Heartland.

By going ahead and building in the Shilo block, the government sends three messages.  The first is that whenever the left tries to tear down a community using the courts, a new legal one will be built. The second is that Area C (where a majority of Jews live in Judea and Samaria) is and will be Israeli.  The third is, Oslo is dead.

With an American veto guaranteed, the Trump administration too distracted domestically, and a region in chaos, Israel is finaly free to develop its country the way it sees fit.  So where does that leave the Abbas clan and its vehicle for corruption called the Palestinian Authority?  Heading towards the dumpster.

Palestinian Authority Loses its Grip Over Hebron Upgrade

The Palestinian Authority’s reaction to the Hebron community’s municipal upgrade last week has become unhinged. Sensing the move essentially means that the Jewish residents of the city will not be removed from what is the Jewish people’s second most holiest city, Palestinian Arabs now understand that the coming parameters of a “peace deal” may not be to their liking.

“The order jeopardizes any political settlement in the area, which stands in contradiction with the peace process and the establishment of a Palestinian state,” Kamel Hamid the Palestinian Authority representative who also acts as their governor in the Hebron area said to the PA’s Wafa news agency.

More and more Israelis are recognizing that the blatant land theft as well as the continued twisting of history on the part of Arabs living in the area makes it near impossible to reach a final status agreement. In place of that, Israel has had no choice but to begin to extend its sovereignty to areas that have been historically Jewish since before the Arab population occupied them in the late 19th Century and early 20th Century.

In 1929, the Arab population rioted and killed 68 Jews in the ancient Jewish community.  The rest of the community fled. The Jewish community existed there since ancient times with the main building known as the Tomb of the Patriarchs being built over the grave site of Israel’s Patriarchs and Matriarchs by King Herod more than 2000 years ago.

The Arab population has gone out of its way to erase Jewish history in the city.  The latest upgrade by Israel, essentially freezes the assumption that Hebron is on the negotiating table.  With this in mind, a two-state solution seems to be the farthest thing from reality.

More importantly Israel has finally begun to call the Palestinian Arab bluff and started to make moves to integrate important parts of its biblically significant homeland into pre-1967 Israel.  This movement to finally assert Jewish sovereignty over what was always been Jewish land means a weakening of the Palestinian Authority control over Judea and Samaria.

With Hebron now off the table and continued reclamation of Jewish property in Jerusalem continuing, the PA has little claim to the rest of Judea and Samaria.  Abbas and his clan may have grown rich off of siphoning money from Western investments into their political racket dubbed the Palestinian Authority, but they are losing their grip on what matters most.

Israel’s growing control over its historical homeland may appear slow-moving, but it is moving forward none-the-less. It is this movement at the end of the day which will determining the sovereign in Judea and Samaria.