Martin Sherman, Author at Israel Rising

July 11, 2017

MODI IN ISRAEL: Bonding the biggest & most beleaguered democracies

Clearly reflecting the impact of the change in Indian policy towards Israel was the chagrin expressed by the Palestinian envoy to New Delhi: “We were shocked…”

A curious Indian stops a passing Israeli backpacker on a New Delhi street. “Tell me,” he asks, “how many Israelis are there?”

“I’m not quite sure,” the backpacker answers. “About six million.”

“No, no no,” retorts the Indian, “not just in New Delhi. I mean all together.”

The humor of this well-known joke reflects a remarkable reality which helps understand the huge enthusiasm this week’s landmark visit of the Indian Prime Minister Nahindra Modi generated, and clearly heralded a “change of gears” in relations between the two countries.

Hindu-Jewish affinity

Each year, over 60,000 Israelis travel to India –many of them “unwinding” in the country after completing military service. Their presence is highly visible across much of the country. Indeed, the “giant shadow” Israelis cast in India is wildly disproportionate to the miniscule dimensions of their homeland. In some outlying locations, Israelis comprise a dominant percentage of foreign visitors. Even in central sites such as the main market in Old Delhi it is not uncommon to see Hebrew signs and encounter merchants able to converse with Israeli customers in fairly fluent Hebrew.

That Israelis seem to feel an instinctive affinity for India should perhaps not be surprising. Its history is virtually devoid of antisemitism. Indeed, the only significant incidents were the Moors’ attack on the Jews in 1524 and the Portuguese persecution of Jews in Cranganore (now the Kerala coast) some years later. Moreover, many Indian Jews achieved great prominence, among them the Sassoons (for whom the Sassoon docks, the Sassoon hospital, and other well-known sites have been named), Dr. E. Moses (a Jewish mayor of Bombay), Lt. Gen. J. F. R. Jacobs (a general in the Indian Army who oversaw the Pakistani Army’s 1971 surrender in Bangladesh and later served as governor of Goa and Punjab), Nissim Ezekiel (a poet/leading Indian literary personality), and Dr. Abraham Solomon Erulkar (the personal physician/friend of Mahatma Gandhi).

Dispersing ideo-political cloud of “post-colonial” prejudice

However, Indo-Israeli relations were not always characterized by such warmth.

On the political and diplomatic fronts, the two nations were largely estranged for the four decades following their independence in the late 1940s. Thus, although India recognized the State of Israel in 1950, the then-ruling Congress Party eschewed full diplomatic relations, siding with the Palestinians and denouncing what many in its ranks termed the “Zionist enterprise” as an imperialist creation of Western colonial powers.

Additional factors also weighed against close and cordial bilateral bonds: New Delhi’s fear of antagonizing its large Muslim population; pressures from the Islamic world, India’s major source of energy; the fate of the many Indian workers in the Gulf States, and the anti-Israeli attitude of the non-aligned movement, in which India was a leading member.

Moreover, in terms of strategic allegiances, an additional rift between the two states existed: Israel aligned itself firmly with the United States, while India, then traditionally suspicious of American foreign policy, opted for close links with the Soviet Union. The significant disparity between the two countries hardly boded well for mutual cooperation between them. However, since the early 1990s, with the fall of the Soviet bloc and the accelerating liberalization of the Indian economy, considerable changes began to take place, bringing with them a marked convergence of Indo-Israeli interests.

The culmination of this process took place in 1992, when full diplomatic relations were established. Since then, a burgeoning relationship has blossomed, whose vigor, cordiality and durability have taken both its proponents and its opponents by surprise.

Removing the reticence

The establishment of full diplomatic ties between Jerusalem and New Delhi allowed the underlying Indo-Israeli affinity to express itself. Yet, until the Modi government came to power there has been a perceptible reticence, or at least reserve, on the part of India with regard to its relationship with Israel.

One particular sore point was India’s consistent support of anti-Israel resolutions in international forums, such as the UN. One commentator characterized the Israeli perception in the following terms: “Israel has long complained that India treats it like a mistress: glad to partake of its defense and technology charms, but a little embarrassed about the whole thing and unwilling to make the relationship too public.”

But with the rise to power of the Modi government, this restraint is beginning to fade discernably, and India has ceased to support a number of motions of censure against Israel in several UN bodies. Clearly reflecting the impact of this change was the chagrin expressed by the Palestinian envoy to New Delhi, at India’s decision not to support a resolution condemning Israel: “We were shocked. The Palestinian people and the leaders were very happy with the UN resolution, but the voting of India has broken our happiness.”

Indeed, Modi’s effusively warm physical embrace of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as he descended from the plane that brought him to Israel, seems to have unequivocally melted away any residual reticence that might have remained.

Modi’s landmark visit

The visit of Indian Prime Minister Modi is undeniably a landmark event of potentially historical proportions. Attesting to this is the virtually unprecedented attention he has been given by the media and the public in Israel—far beyond that accorded most visiting heads of government.

As the first Indian premier to visit the Jewish State, Modi has unabashedly cast aside any restraint in forging future relations with Israel. Indeed, despite his country’s heavy reliance on oil from the Middle East (or “Western Asia” as the Indians tend to call it)—chiefly Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran—Modi appears to have come to the conclusion that India has more to gain from throwing in its lot with Israel than with the Arab States, who seem to consistently lend their support to India’s rival, Pakistan.

Two of Modi’s decisions on this trip—perhaps more symbolic than substantive—seem to distil out the essence of the new Indian approach to Israel: The one, political; the other, humanitarian.

The first was the Indian PM’s decision not to include the customary visit to Ramallah, made by virtually all visiting senior statesmen to maintain the appearance of scrupulous even-handedness in the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

Landmark visit (cont.)

Thus despite the fact that the Indian government continues to declare its ongoing support for the “Palestinian cause” there can be no glossing over the implicit message in Modi’s decision to skip—some might say, snub—the Palestinian Authority by excluding any meeting with any of its senior representatives.

In this, he showed commendable courage in flouting the bonds of the constrictive conventions of political correctness—and the willingness to break from past patterns, which bodes well for the independent development of bilateral relations in the future.

The other defining event was Modi’s decision to visit Moshe (Moish) Holtzberg, the boy whose parents, Gavriel and Rivka Holtzberg, were murdered in a 2008 attack on the Chabad center in Mumbai by an Islamist terrorist group based in Pakistan. The attack was one of a dozen carried out throughout the city in late November, 2008, that left 164 dead and at least 308 wounded.

In making this moving gesture, Modi not only showed a laudable sensitivity on a personal level, but also underscored the common threats/enemies faced by both countries and the joint perils that menace both Israelis and Indians.

So although the visit included a dizzying array of sites and installations, highlighting Israel’s capabilities and achievements in culture, technology, agriculture, and security it was these two events—resolute moral clarity on the one hand and human empathy on the other—that imparted a distinctive quality to the visit—making it one of the most memorable in years.

Indeed, as one scholar of Indo-Israeli ties, Souptik Mukherjee, pointed out: “While the visit has many dimensions, the most important aspect is not the joint development of arms, not the prospect of free trade agreement but rather the shared values and historical ties.”

Marrying “Make in India” with “Make with India”

The visit also produced some interesting rhetorical innovations.

In September 2015 Modi launched his “Make in India” initiative to encourage foreign corporations to manufacture their products in India. To date it appears to be an impressive success, with India emerging as the top destination globally for foreign direct investment, surpassing the United States and China!

In his effusive welcoming address on Modi’s arrival, Netanyahu mentioned Modi’s “Make in India” project and added a twist, suggesting an additional project: ”Make with India” in which both countries, would exploit the synergies of Indo-Israeli cooperation and engage in joint ventures across a range of civilian and military fields.

Given the huge nascent consumer demand in India, its burgeoning middle class, the daunting security challenges it faces from both state and non-state actors innately hostile to Israel as well, there is little doubt that both formulae—Israeli manufacturing plants in Israel, and joint Indo-Israel projects in either country—offer almost boundless prospects.

Referring to ongoing cooperation in the field of space, Netanyahu underscored–with a touch of hyperbole—the almost limitless opportunities a marriage of “Make in India” and “Make with India” could create. He recalled: “I remember what you told me in our first meeting – when it comes to India and Israel relations, the sky is the limit. But now, prime minister, let me add [that] even the sky is not the limit. We are also cooperating in space.”

A personal sense of vindication

While the Modi visit and the surge in Indo-Israeli ties is an historic event for the Jewish State at a national level, it is for me, at a personal level, a gratifying vindication of many years of my prior efforts.

With all due (im)modesty, I was—to the best of my knowledge—the first Israeli to write, in detail, about the strategic importance of India’s international ascendency for Israel.

Almost two decades ago, in early 1999, I published a policy paper, together with a prominent Indian scholar, the late Prof. M. L. Sondhi, one of the original pro-Israeli voices in India. The paper we collaborated on was entitled “Indo-Israeli cooperation as a US national interest. It was a paper that predicted/prescribed much of the later developments between the two countries, across a range of various fields.

We saw the resilient nature of the democratic governance of the two countries, which straddle a vast area of unbroken tyranny, as an important element in bolstering the bilateral bond between the two nations.

The durability and sustainability of democratic governance in both Israel and India should not be taken for granted. Indeed, it should be recalled that both countries’ democracies have faced serious challenges that could well have been conducive to more authoritarian forms of government. Both India and Israel are countries ringed by hostile enemies; the societies in both countries include potentially fractious and rivalrous ethnic groups, creating fertile grounds for internal strife. Both have weathered the trauma of political assassination and external wars on their borders. Yet despite these severe challenges, the commitment of both countries to democratic governance, societal pluralism and official respect for religious diversity have never wavered.

An idea whose time has come…

Significantly, one of the areas which we identified as being of particular potential was that of cooperation in the naval sphere, especially in regard to security in the Indian Ocean, predicting that, in light of the specter of a potential non-conventional threat, it would become an increasingly important theatre of operations for Israel. This has indeed proved true in light of Iran’s nuclear program, greatly enhancing its strategic importance for Israel’s navy and especially its submarine arm, which has become a vital component of Israel’s second-strike capability and its deterrence posture vis-a-vis a nuclear rival.

It is, of course, most satisfying to see many of the recommendations which Sondhi and I made come to fruition.

French poet Victor Hugo famously wrote: “All the forces in the world are not so powerful as an idea whose time has come.

This certainly appears to be the case with the flourishing Indo-Israeli nexus. Indeed, Sondhi and I concluded the executive summary of our paper thus: “…it appears that the time is right for Israel to establish a special relationship with the world’s largest democracy, similar to the relationship that it has developed with the world’s strongest democracy. ..[This], is likely to have a vital role in advancing the principles of liberty and pluralism, and insuring regional stability in an extensive and important portion of the world where such principles are under continual siege.”

Surely, then, this is an idea whose time has come.

June 29, 2017

Does Israel Have a Fifth Column?

Originally submitted under the title: Israel’s disloyal—and dishonest—opposition

It is time for representatives of the Israeli Left to come to terms with the existence of “The Other”, and the idea that people who think differently to them are just as legitimate as those who look different to them.

We are undergoing a process of fascistization of Israeli politics. These are hard words but they are true. Artists, actors and playwrights are under threat, Supreme Court justices and judges generally are threatened, journalists are fired and are threatened, journalists and newspapers are under threat of being closed by the authorities, and now also academics are under threat and can say nothing.

– Head of Opposition, Isaac Herzog, Holon, June, 24, 2017

Over last weekend Israel’s most implacable enemies were handed a major bonanza, courtesy of the nominal head of the Opposition in Israel, Isaac Herzog.

Speaking at a cultural event in Holon on Saturday, Herzog effectively lent credence to the most libelous vilification of the Jewish state’s detractors, affirming their malicious and mendacious portrayal of it as a fascist entity. Thus, in a stroke, Herzog’s injudicious display of partisan political pique, inflicted inestimable damage on his country, undoing years of laborious efforts of pro-Israel advocates to present the Jewish state as a lone and valiant defender of democracy in a regional sea of tyrannical darkness.

“Fascism”: The perennial Pavlovian slur

Accusations of “fascism” have become response du jour of the electorally frustrated Left” whenever their Right-of-Center rivals propose some moderately assertive initiative that is perceived as potentially reducing the arbitrary powers of unelected Left-leaning civil society elites, who, as I have pointed out elsewhere, hold the real reins of power in the state—rather than the elected politicians (See for example Understanding politics in Israel: the Limousine Theory; The Limousine Theory (cont): Irrefutable illustrations; egregious examples; Israel’s crybullies; Who really runs Israel?)

It is through its dominance of these small, but disproportionately powerful, unelected elites—chiefly in the legal establishment, the mainstream media and the academe (particularly in the social sciences and the humanities)—that the Israeli “Left” manages to maintain much of its control over political processes within the country, despite the continual erosion of its electoral appeal.

Accordingly, as it is unable to exercise influence by popular support, it is compelled to do so via small, electorally insignificant, but substantially influential groups, which in effect are the last remnants of Left-wing political relevance. It is, therefore, in no way unexpected to find that any attempt—no matter how sound its rationale and equitable its intent—to limit, indeed, even regulate, the inordinate powers of these groups will invariably elicit a visceral response, designed to discredit, delegitimize and demonize such a measure.

Of course, nothing serves this egregious purpose better than the tactic of dubbing such initiatives as “fascist”—even when they are patently nothing of the sort, and in many cases, are precisely the opposite. This, then, is the reason why this derogatory epithet has become the perennial, almost Pavlovian slur, invoked whenever the electorally frustrated Left senses that the powers of what in effect are its political agents, are to be curtailed—or even scrutinized—in the public debate.

Redressing Left-wing preponderance as “fascism

Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising to encounter signs of frantic Left-wing alarm whenever the prospect of a new initiative, aimed at changing either the prevailing administrative or allocative criteria in the cultural, legal, media, and/or academic establishment is raised.

Of course, such initiatives can only be dubbed partisan because they address—indeed, are intended to redress—situations which are, apriori, heavily skewed towards Left wing dominance.

And indeed, the “F” word is predictably and precipitously brandished whenever any attempt is made to:
– Change the allocation of resources in publicly funded cultural institutions, hitherto almost exclusively monopolized by “Left”-leaning administrators and artists;

– Institute greater transparency in the disclosure of funding of political activity by foreign governments, using radical “Left”-wing NGOs to advance the opposition to the policy of the elected government;

– Inject greater openness into the appointment process of candidates for the judiciary, mired, as it is, in cozy cronyism that virtually bars admission to anyone but the ideologically likeminded;

-Introduce greater plurality in the range of political philosophies students are exposed to in academia.

As head of the Opposition, Herzog has shown particular alacrity in casting aspersions on his country’s democratic credentials, especially when the pesky demos (people) has chosen—in free and fair elections—to confer the kratos (power) on his political rivals.

Invoking the “F” word for political gain

Sadly, Herzog’s derogatory outburst last week was not the first time he invoked the “F” word for political purposes.

Thus, when the elected government of Israel introduced a bill to promote greater transparency regarding the funding of Israeli NGOs, who receive the bulk of their financial support from foreign governments, this was greeted by howls of protest by Left-leaning circles, alleging that, somehow, enhanced transparency undermines democracy. Go figure!

Herzog took a leading role in the outcry against greater transparency. Thus “The Guardian” reported: “…the strongest condemnation came from the Israeli opposition leader, Isaac Herzog, who told reporters before the vote: ‘The NGO law … is indicative, more than anything, of the budding fascism creeping into Israeli society’ ”—as if the future of Israeli democracy depended on unrestricted surreptitious funding of what are in effect foreign agents.

Indeed, quite the opposite is the case. The funding these entities receive from alien sovereign governments off-sets their minuscule public support in Israel. It provides them with the resources to enhance their domestic impact far beyond their true proportions – by means of well-publicized legal action and high-profile public relations initiatives in promoting an agenda which their foreign backers endorse. This of course is a grave distortion of Israel’s democratic process. For, it allows foreign governments, by means of their taxpayers’ money and domestic Israeli entities, not only to stymie the policies the government was elected to implement, but at times, to compel it to implement measures it was elected to prevent.

To make the point: One can only image the furor that would erupt if the Israeli government poured millions in to Spanish NGOs calling for Basque separatism, utilizing Spanish courts and Spanish media to advance the Basque separatists cause. And who would accuse Spain of “fascism” if it took umbrage at such activity, and instituted legislation to curtail it?

Invoking the “F” word (cont.)

Herzog was once again eager to employ the “fascist” smear against the Education Minister Bennett’s academic “code of conduct”, formulated by highly reputable philosopher and Israel Prize laureate, Prof. Asher Kasher—who hardly fits the role of some radical Right-wing extremist.

He railed against the proposed code: “It is a grave act that harms one of the greatest powers among the Jewish people and the State of Israel – the right to argue and to express a different opinion…” adding ominously: “When you muzzle poets and authors, artists and actors, judges and journalists and now academics – it is a dangerous step toward [wait for it-MS] fascism.”

This, of course, is a deliberately malicious misrepresentation of the matter. After all, “the code of conduct” was a response to the inhibition/intimidation many students feel when expressing opinions that diverge from those expounded by their radical Left-wing lecturers, and to the narrow range of political philosophies they are exposed to in the classroom.

Although, elsewhere, I have expressed skepticism as to the efficacy of Bennett’s initiative, to brand it as “muzzling” academics is patently absurd—since it would not impinge on research, publications, presentations at conferences or extra-mural public activities. Moreover, rather than to restrict debate, its purpose is to widen it, by addressing the virtual stranglehold the Left has on academic discourse—particularly in the social sciences and humanities.

Should anyone doubt the existence of such exclusive Left-wing dominance, I would challenge anyone to identify a single senior tenured academic (and certainly any junior academic seeking tenure) in any major academic establishment, who overtly challenged the Oslo “peace process”, warned of the death and destruction it would wreak on Jew and Arab alike, and urged the Israeli government, publically and persistently, to abandon the perilous path it had embarked upon.

Perfidy as the hallmark of liberal democracy?

A similar brouhaha erupted with the introduction of the rather injudiciously named “Loyalty in Culture” bill, by controversial Culture Minister Miri Regev, evoking the usually dire warnings of encroaching “fascism”.

However, the existing law already stipulated that the state can in fact withhold funds from institutions, which:
– incite racism, violence or terrorism;

-support armed conflict/terrorism against Israel;

-deny Israel’s existence as a Jewish and democratic state;

– mark the establishment of the State of Israel/Independence Day as a day of mourning (Nakba);

– dishonor/deface the Israeli flag or state symbols.

So, in effect, all the bill really did was transfer the existing authority from the Finance Ministry, where such sanctions were not robustly enforced, to the Ministry of Culture, where they may well be.

Moreover, the bill did not mandate any restriction on the freedom of expression. Accordingly, should any cultural institution feel the need to conduct cultural activity that incites racism or violence, or supports armed conflict or terrorism against Israel, it is free to do so.

It should not, however, expect the state to subsidize subversion, or to fund its own demise. However, judging from the Left-leaning opposition’s verbal assault on the bill, it would appear that many of them think it should.

Indeed, the vehement denigration of the term “loyalty” might easily lead us to believe that, in the eyes of the Left, a license for perfidy is the hallmark of their vision of fascist-free liberal democracy.

Difficult to overstate strategic damage

It is difficult to overstate the damage that domestic denigration of Israel’s democratic credentials inflicts on the country.

After all, one of the gravest strategic challenges Israel faces today is the international campaign to delegitimize and isolate it in the global community, and to cut it off from its sources of support by portraying it as unworthy of such support.

Accordingly, Israel’s most inimical foes seize eagerly on these unfounded characterizations of the country, in their unceasing endeavor to discredit, delegitimize and demonize it.

Thus, for example, the Iranian site ParsToday regularly pounces on Herzog’s derogatory diatribes, prominently parading them, in various languages, as allegedly representing the realities in Israel. Under a strident headline, in its Spanish edition, portraying Israel as fatally fractured society, it announced “Herzog: Israel is on the verge of a civil war” quoting the head of the Opposition’s assessment of the “transparency law” as “symboliz[ing] the fascism that is flourishing in Israeli society.”

ParsToday’s English edition ran a piece with a headline citing the “Israeli opposition leader” warning :“Israeli politicians inciting hatred, racism”. In the body of the report it informed its readers: “The 55-year-old chairman of the Labor Party further blamed the administration of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for the prevalence of the rising fascist discourse…”

ParsToday was also quick to exploit one of Herzog’s toxic tirades in the Knesset. Indeed, on the day after he delivered it, the site (in its Hebrew edition) blared “Herzog: Israel is afflicted with Ultra-Nationalism and infected with the seeds of Fascism”

Gee, I wonder what the English word is to describe someone who systematically undermines his country’s strategic interests.

Time for Left to acknowledge “The Other”

Of course, the very fact that the Left-wing opposition can continuously castigate the current coalition with impunity without any real fear of retribution is, in itself, arguably the most resounding repudiation of the repeated accusations of “fascism”.

After all, what self-respecting fascist regime would tolerate such recalcitrant behavior? Indeed, its perpetrators would have long been dispatched, post haste, to either prison—or the hereafter.

Surely the time has come for the Left-wing opposition to realize that their reckless rhetoric inflicts tremendous and unwarranted harm on their country; surely the time has come for them to desist from this egregious tactic for electoral advantage—especially as it has proven so hopelessly ineffectual.

In this regard, perhaps the Left would do well to recall that is has always prided itself on its acceptance of the “The Other”.

So in its quest for greater success in the democratic process, perhaps it is time for the representatives of the Israeli Left to come to terms with the existence of “The Other” and reconcile itself with the idea that people who think differently to them are just as legitimate as those who look different to them.

June 23, 2017June 23, 2017

Gaza Proves the Two State Solution Does Not Work

Originally published as: INTO THE FRAY- Gaza:The ultimate indictment of “two-statism”

The real humanitarian solution to the plight of Gaza lies not in its reconstruction, but in its deconstruction

…the prospective Palestinian state is bound to be a failed and repressive entity, and a permanent danger to its Israeli and Jordanian neighbors Elliott Abrams, in a briefing to the Middle East Forum, June 15, 2017

Hamas wants Israel to supply it with electricity “or else”, but there is no reason why Israel should submit to Hamas extortion. It is not Israel’s obligation to satisfy the needs of a population that continues, through its ongoing support of Hamas, to pursue Israel’s destruction. Efraim Inbar, Gaza in the Dark Is Not So Terrible, June 18, 2017

What is the point of raising and spending many millions of dollars to rebuild the Gaza Strip just so it can be destroyed in the next war? It’s a harsh question. Given the region’s tragic history, it is also inevitable. –New York Times Editorial, October 10, 2014

Once again Gaza is in the news.

Once again the specter of “humanitarian disaster” hovers over the population on the coastal enclave, the hapless victims of the hopelessly ill-conceived endeavor to foist statehood on the Palestinian-Arabs.

Inane and iniquitous idea

Ironically, this time the deteriorating plight of the Gazans was not thrust into the media spotlight because of any Israeli initiative—or indeed, not even because of any Israeli response to Palestinian aggression—but rather at the behest of the nominal head of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas.

It was, after all, at Abbas’s request that Israel reduced even further the already scant supply of electricity to the beleaguered territory, making life even more onerous for the unfortunate population of the Gaza Strip—apart, of course, from the vastly wealthy cliques of connected cronies.

Clearly, the power cuts were merely one additional measure of misery the average Gazan has had to endure since the fatally flawed formula of two-statism was instigated almost a quarter-century ago.

This inane and iniquitous idea has wrought almost every imaginable hardship on the residents of this ill-fated strip of land: Spiraling unemployment; collapsing infrastructure, domestic tyranny and fratricidal factionalism.

Depending on which report one chooses to lend credence to, unemployment has reached 40%-60% and is particularly severe among the young and the more educated segments of the population; up to 96% of the water resources are reported to be unfit for drinking; the only power station has shut down because of a lack of fuel following, the refusal of Abbas to foot the bill; the supply of electricity has been cut from four hours a day to three; the lack of sewage treatment and disposal is becoming critical.

These then, are all the bitter fruits of two-statism.

Trying to solve the problem by reintroducing its cause?

Of course, one of the most absurd aspects of the discourse on the future of Gaza and how to handle the grave and growing problems of the area, is the prevailing platitude that the governance of the area should somehow be wrested from Hamas and restored to Abbas’s Fatah, whose corrupt and dysfunctional governance was the reason for Hamas’s ascendance in the first place. As if reinstating the cause for the current problem will somehow solve it.

Unsurprisingly, the Palestinian-Arabs, particularly those in Gaza, seem decidedly skeptical as to the efficacy of such a measure. Indeed, recent Palestinian polls point to wide spread dissatisfaction with Abbas and Fatah. Overall, in the Palestinian-administered territories, almost two thirds feel that Abbas, who has been in office three times his elected term, should resign, while 70% hold this view in Gaza. Indeed, the fear that Hamas may well win a new election is widely considered the reason that none have been held since 2005.

Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that without Israel’s military presence in Judea-Samaria, the Abbas regime would be speedily disposed of, as it was in Gaza. Accordingly, there is little reason to believe that, were Abbas’s control over Gaza reinstated, it could endure without restoring IDF presence there as well—hardly something advocates of Abbas’s return seem to advocate.

Nothing unpredictable, nor unpredicted.

The tragedy is that there is nothing about the Gaza fiasco that was not entirely foreseeable, and indeed, foreseen.

Over the last half-decade, I have written a slew of articles warning of the futility and folly of trying to maintain autonomous Arab rule in Gaza. But, perhaps more significantly, over a quarter-century ago (1992) I penned an article, Why we can’t dump Gaza, predicting precisely the course of events that would unfold if Israel abandoned Gaza—events that should have been obvious to anyone with the even slightest grasp of the most rudimentary elements of political science and related disciplines.

I warned: “The inevitable implication of Israeli withdrawal [from Gaza] can be ignored only at great peril to Israelis and Arabs alike”, and explained why such a measure would lead to the take-over by extremist elements like Hamas: “In the ensuing political vacuum [left by Israeli withdrawal], the most radical and violet elements in Gaza would undoubtedly seize power. In the absence of recognized institutions of government, all the more moderate elements would be speedily eliminated, either politically or physically”—as indeed they were!

I cautioned as to the impact of inadequate infrastructure: “The Gaza Strip does not have the means to sustain any semblance of durable economic life. Its water resources are increasingly being salinated through over-use, it has no land reserves, no indigenous sources of energy or power, no existing infrastructure for the conduct of international trade…”

Accordingly, I pointed out: “A total separation between Israel and the Gaza Strip …to stop the flow of ‘undesirable’ workers in search of the livelihood their immediate environs cannot provide” would precipitate widespread unemployment and resultant turmoil: “A denial of employment would inevitably increase the frustration and bitterness of the beleaguered population and its potential for incitement, lawlessness and violence”.

Foreseeing economic privation, violence and international censure

I identified the difficulties Israel would have in maintaining security and preventing smuggling of armaments particularly along the maritime border and Sinai frontier: “…the IDF would only be able to supervise along the northern and [eastern] approaches to the Strip. It would have no control over smugglers wishing to enter from the west (via the sea) or the south (via Sinai)”.

The result was not difficult to forecast: “ The combination of these elements is a certain formula for explosive social and political unrest, feeding on a deepening sense of hopelessness, misery and deprivation of the local population, feelings which will inevitably be directed against the most obvious and convenient target – Israel.”

The diagnosis of what was to follow was unequivocally clear, making operations such Cast Lead, Pillar of Defense and Protective Edge unavoidable: “…our southern settlements and towns will be the targets of frequent attacks, which will compel Israel to retaliate.”

The predicament of waging “asymmetric” war was not hard to foretell.

I wrote: “But how and against whom? Without a military presence, the IDF will not be able to identify and apprehend those responsible…”, and warned of the ramifications of “collateral damage” and consequent international censure: “Air strikes or artillery shelling on civilian population centers will cause heavy casualties among the dense, destitute masses in whose midst the attackers would conceal themselves”, asking trenchantly: “How would world opinion react”.

Consequently, I predicted: “Unilateral withdrawal from Gaza will do nothing to ease the socio-economic plight of the local inhabitants, nor will it reduce the politico-security problems of Israel; rather it will be likely to exacerbate them.” I leave it to the reader to judge to what degree that prediction has been borne out.

Underscoring the untenability of two-statism

Accordingly, just how hopeless the doctrine of two-statism is, especially with regard to Gaza, should have been abundantly clear from the get-go for anyone with an iota of intellectual integrity and a smidgeon of analytical ability. But, if for some reason, anyone required further proof, Abbas’s initiative to impose further hardship on his harrowed kinfolk should provide it, removing all shadow of doubt.

For it served to highlight two things (a) The dismal plight of the Gazan population, who along with the residents of Jericho, were the first to be subjected to the egregious experiment of thrusting self-government on the Palestinian-Arabs, two-and-half decades after the start of that experiment; (b) the callous disregard that the Palestinian-Arab leadership has for the welfare of their people. After all, calling for the reduction of power to Gaza is a measure that will negatively impact virtually every walk of life, from the functioning of medical equipment through sewage treatment to desalination plants for production of scarce drinking water.

The miserable circumstances in Gaza—in terms of the physical conditions that prevail, the quality of governance, and the priorities of the leadership—offer prospects for the future that, charitably, can only be described as bleak—underscoring just how untenable the dogma of two-statism has shown itself to be.

Israel’s counter-productive largesse

Indeed, the three introductory excerpts encapsulate the enduring and endemic hopelessness that is Gaza.

The first (from Elliot Abrams) relates to the nature of the political entity that can be expected to emerge from any process of two-statism. After all, there is little reason to believe—and certainly no evidence that the empirical record has produced in the last quarter century—that the prospective Palestinian-Arab state will be anything but a homophobic, misogynistic Muslim-majority tyranny. Indeed, even its most fervent proponents have yet to produce anything approaching a persuasive argument to have us believe otherwise.

The second (from Prof. Efraim Inbar) relates to the nature of the population that will inhabit the political entity and the kind of conduct we can expect from it. As Inbar remarks: “…the Gazans cannot be exempted from responsibility for the consequences of Hamas’s actions…Hamas remains popular in Gaza, and all polls show that Gazans support continued violence against Israel. The Gazans are…not good neighbors, and…do not deserve Israel’s sympathy.”

The third (from the New York Times editorial) relates to the nature of the prospects the territory has for its future—and futility of maintaining the belief that there is any point to sustaining the two-state enterprise. For it raises the “harsh” but “inevitable” question: “Given the region’s tragic history” what is the point of further reconstruction efforts?

In this regard, Inbar echoes this trenchant question. Taking it a little further he asks: “What moral justification exists that compels Israelis to assist people who support an organization intent on destroying them?”

His answer: “There is no strategic or moral reason why Israel should supply free electricity to Gaza.”

Humanitarian Solution to Humanitarian Crisis: Deconstruction not Reconstruction

Inbar is of course entirely correct. The Israeli government would do well to heed his counsel, and, taking its cue from Abbas’s demand, begin a phased withdrawal of all services and goods it currently provides the Palestinian Arabs, while offering the non-belligerent residents generous relocation grants, so that they can seek better, more secure lives elsewhere—outside the “cycle of violence” that the leaders wreak upon them regularly.

As I have pointed on numerous occasions, this will allow them to extricate themselves not only from any resultant “humanitarian crisis”, but also from the clutches of the cruel, corrupt cliques that have led them astray for decades.

Thus, the real humanitarian solution to the plight of Gaza lies not in its reconstruction but in its deconstruction.

Indeed I raised this proposal in my 1992 article, by asking: “What, then, is the solution to this festering and intractable problem?”

I began my answer by pointing out: “It is essential to realize that no measure, whether total annexation or total withdrawal, can be reconciled with either Israel’s security or the welfare of the Arab population there”.

I clarified “This is not a call for a forcibly imposed racist ‘transfer’ by Israel, but rather for the initiation of an appeal to enlist international support for the rehabilitation elsewhere of hundreds of thousands of refugees. They are the victims of war, held hostage…by those purporting to be committed to their welfare”.

In conclusion, I urged: “Instead of expounding the merits of a policy of dismantling Jewish settlements or abandoning the fate of Jewish settlers to some autonomous Arab regime (both antithetical to the Zionist ethos), the…leadership charged with responsibility for the conduct of Israel’s foreign policy would do well to devote its efforts to marshalling international pressure in support of this humane and historically imperative enterprise.”

Imagine how different things might have been, had my call been heeded, instead of waiting 25 years–for the ultimate indictment of two-statism.

June 16, 2017

Can Naftali Bennett Uproot the Left’s Monopoly on Israeli Academia

Submitted under the title: Bennett’s academic code: Right sentiment, wrong strategy

In-depth 2013 study: “Israeli academics have been free to engage in ‘nazification’ of Israel”

Had such professional misconduct occurred in the natural or physical sciences there would have doubtless been serious consequences: e.g. the collapse of a bridge following phony engineering calculations…Yet it would seem that when it comes to the social sciences or the humanities… the researcher can escape punishment for the worst kind of malpractice…In this Orwellian world where war is peace and ignorance is strength, not only are the falsifiers not censured – they are applauded – Prof Efraim Karsh, on radical left-wing academics in “Fabricating Israeli History”

…no ethical code will open the doors of the left-wing monasteries to the right-wing “heretics” who dare to think differently than the pseudo-liberals who dominate them. – Dr. Dror Eydar, Israel Hayom, June 12, 2017

Earlier this week, Education Minister Naftali Bennett caused a huge public uproar when he introduced his proposed “Code of Ethics” for the country’s institutions of higher learning, stipulating rules, or at least, guidelines, for the conduct of lecturers in the classroom.

The two principle components of the “Code” appear to be constraints on lecturers, restricting them from (a) promoting their personal political views in class and (b) endorsing the boycott of Israel, in general and from calling for an academic boycott against it, in particular.

Cat among the Establishment pigeons?

Bennett’s initiative certainly set the proverbial “cat among the pigeons” across the nation’s academic Establishment—and beyond.

Indeed, it was immediately excoriated by all and sundry—including our oh-so politically correct president, Reuven Rivlin—alleging that it would somehow undermine academic freedom and inhibit the vigor of academic inquiry.

These allegations are, of course, totally unfounded and should be rebuffed with the disdain they so richly deserve.

Indeed, as Dror Eydar notes: “This characterization [of the proposed code] as an ‘attack on democracy’ and ‘attack on academic freedom’ are as much as an insult to our intelligence as they are deceitful”.

He adds acerbically and aptly: “If there is an assault on freedom of expression, it exists right now in most the departments of social sciences and humanities, which function as ‘gatekeepers’ that preclude admission of lecturers and researchers who hold conservative-right-wing views…”

Eydar’s harsh condemnation mirrors much of my own personal experience but that is something I shall return to shortly.

At this stage, however it is clear that Bennett has put his finger on a crucial issue, impacting the tenor of the public discourse in Israel, and judging from the furor that it has ignited, it appears to have touched a raw nerve among the entrenched and entitled academic elites.

Spotlighting the stranglehold

In this, he has shown considerable courage for broaching the subject boldly and should be warmly commended for spotlighting one of most acute issues afflicting the nation today: The stranglehold of the Left on academic discourse in—and about—Israel.

However, two trenchant questions regarding his initiative must be raised: (a) What is the scope and severity of this problem? (b) Are the measures proposed the most appropriate and effective for dealing with it?

As to the former, there can be little doubt as to both the dimensions and gravity of the problem. As to the latter, there is regrettably considerable doubt as to whether the “Code” is the optimal instrument for addressing the problem—or if it addresses the cardinal components of it at all.

Just how grave the problem of exclusionary bias is in the Israeli academe—at least in the Social Sciences and Humanities –is reflected in a comprehensive study of academic freedom in Israel by the widely respected researcher, Professor Ofira Seliktar.

Entitled “Academic Freedom in Israel: A Comparative Perspective”, it conducts a comparative analysis of the situation in Israel, the UK and Germany and comes up with several disturbing conclusions regarding the abuse of academic freedom in Israel.

The following are some of the more worrying excerpts from the study.

“Zionism is a colonial-imperialist movement…”

Seliktar depicts the prevailing atmosphere in much of the Social Sciences and Humanities in the country’s academic institutions: “Neo-Marxist, critical scholarship has acquired a substantial following in faculties of the liberal arts (the humanities and social sciences) in Israeli universities.”

She elaborates: “Known as post Zionism, it asserts that Zionism is a colonial-imperialist movement and that its progeny, the State of Israel, is a colonial-apartheid country… Israel is presented as a Nazi-like state and the Israel Defense Force…is accused of Nazi-like behavior”.

Seliktar then goes on to depict the exclusionary nature of the syllabuses offered students and the narrow perspectives it provides them: “As a rule, courses offered by self-described post Zionist faculty have been heavily weighted toward this neo-Marxist…paradigm, with little or no effort expended to provide any different perspective.”

She then expounds on how Israeli academics harness their position to advance their radical—even anti-Zionist—political agenda: “Combining academic research and political work, post-Zionist academics have engaged in a robust effort to compel Israel to withdraw from the territories; some advocated the return of Palestinian refugees in order to create a bi-national Jewish-Palestinian entity”.

Moreover, she points to a reprehensible phenomenon, revealing :“Israeli scholars have adopted a leadership role in the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, launched international petition drives condemning the IDF for war crimes, and inspired lawsuits against individual commanders.”

“Israeli academics engage in ‘nazification’ of Israel…”

Seliktar laments: “Government and university authorities have been slow to respond to this threat, due to the prevalent notion that academic freedom protects faculty speech and action, both intramurally and extramurally.”

Just how predictable the current howls of protest at Bennett’s attempt to deal with this outrageous state of affairs are, is reflected in her observation: “…radical scholars and their liberal defenders in the academy and media have warned that imposing any limits would injure Israel’s standing in the academic world and place it at-odds with standards of academic freedom practiced in other democratic countries…”

Seliktar harshly criticizes both the cronyism and the criteria for advancement within Israeli faculties of Social Sciences and Humanities: “…Israeli scholars have been routinely promoted based on publication in radical presses…and journals of dubious academic credibility.”

She warns that “…none of the legal remedies developed in Great Britain and the United States are applicable to Israel…” Thus, according to Seliktar, “Israeli academics have been free to engage in ‘nazification’ and ‘apartheidization’ of Israel”, unencumbered by constraints prevalent in other Western democracies. Furthermore, she cautions that their work has been seized on by Israel’s most indefatigable foes: “Their work has been quoted by pro-Palestinian or pro- Iranian circles seeking academic legitimacy for their positions.”

Summing up, Seliktar cautions that “The lack of understanding of how other countries balance academic freedom with responsibility to state and society has enabled radical scholars not only to abuse academic privileges, but also claim that Israel is sliding toward McCarthyism…”

Right diagnosis, wrong remedy

This then, is the dire predicament that prompted Bennett’s well-intentioned initiative, and with which it was reportedly designed to contend.

However, as emerges from Seliktar’s study, it is unlikely to address the major detrimental effects prevailing today in Israel’s academic milieu, or the grave damage the ongoing abuse of academic freedom is inflicting on Israel internationally.

Of course, I in no way wish to belittle the gravity of the fear of intimidation , even retribution, individual students may feel in the classroom should they have the temerity to challenge the political doctrine expounded by their lecturers. However, at the national level, concern should be focused elsewhere. Here, as Seliktar indicates, the problem is not so much which views are expressed—and which are suppressed—within the limited arena of a lecture. What is most damaging to Israel are those that are aired—or stifled—in academic conferences, journals and mainstream media opinion columns, using academic credentials to lend an air of indisputable authority to views conveyed in them.

However, these effects are not addressed by Bennett’s proposed “Code”. Indeed not only does it not even purport to address them, Bennett himself pointed out, in response to his detractors claims that he is constraining academic activity, that in these matters academics will still have unfettered freedoms.

It is therefore, clear that despite the accurate diagnosis of the malaise in Israel’s institutions of higher learning, the remedy prescribed in Bennett’s initiative will almost certainly be ineffective.

The real problem: Criteria for admission & promotion

Seliktars’s study underscores that the root of the problem is not so much restricting the expression of political proclivities in the lecture hall, but the criterion for admission to the ranks of academia, and for promotion to senior academic positions. These, too, are issues left largely unaddressed by the Bennett “Code”.

To underscore the severity of these two issues, I would challenge the readers to identify any senior tenured academic (and certainly any junior academic seeking tenure) in any major academic establishment, who overtly challenged the Oslo “peace process”, warned of the death and destruction it would wreak on Jew and Arab alike, and urged the Israeli government, publically and persistently, to abandon the perilous path it has embarked upon.

I would be more than grateful to learn of the existence of any such redoubtable “renegade”.

Moreover, consider the question of promotion. Suppose some intrepid academic rebel penned a brilliantly prescient article, predicting precisely the disastrous course the peace process would follow, the gigantic wave of carnage it would precipitate, the terror it would bring to Israeli streets, cafes and buses; and the deprivation and devastation it would bring to the Palestinian-Arabs –particularly in Gaza.

Admission & promotion criteria (cont.)

Anyone, even remotely familiar with the atmosphere that pervaded the academic milieu at the time, would know—as a matter of certainty—that such an article, no matter how exhaustively researched and/or tightly argued, would have little to no chance of publication in any major journal in the field of political science, international relations or any related discipline.

By contrast, if an article, echoing received wisdom of the time, set out a glowing prognosis of how the Middle East was on the threshold of a new era of peace and prosperity, it would have little difficulty in finding its way into the pages of respected academic publications.

So, if the criterion for promotion is one’s record of publication, who is likely be promoted? The candidate who got it totally wrong, but can point to a long list of publications? Or the candidate who got it exactly right, but had no record of published research? The answer is of course painfully clear—sadly reinforcing the lamentable state of affairs in the Israeli academe, so succinctly conveyed by Prof. Karsh in the introductory excerpt: “In this Orwellian world where war is peace and ignorance is strength, not only are the falsifiers not censured – they are applauded.”

Indeed they are!

“…solution is to establish new institutions”

None of these detrimental defects will be remedied by preventing a lecturer from expressing his/her political credo in class, or by compelling him/her to present opposing perspectives to his/her students. Indeed, how realistic is it to expect a radical left-wing professor to present the views of right-wing conservatism in anything approaching an adequate and equitable fashion?

No, the quest for a comprehensive and fundamental remedy must be conducted in an entirely different direction—not by quashing expression of certain positions, but by providing alternative frameworks and mechanisms for the expression of opposing positions that can effectively challenge the dominant (indeed, domineering) paradigm that currently monopolizes the academic discourse.

In this I find myself in complete agreement with Eydar, both when he warns: “no ethical code will open the doors of the left-wing monasteries to the right-wing “heretics” who dare to think differently than the pseudo-liberals who dominate them”; and when he prescribes: “The solution is to establish new institutions and think tanks as an alternative”.

I totally agree and —in the interests of full disclosure—this is the major thrust of my endeavor at the Israel Institute for Strategic Studies, established precisely for this purpose: To establish a “theater of engagement” in which the Left-wing academic elites are compelled to engage intellectual adversaries, and in which their doctrinaire positions can be publically exposed for the dangerous drivel that they really are.

Accordingly, I call on the Education Minister to channel his efforts (and resources) into this and other like-minded enterprises. I have little doubt that this strategy—of fostering more robust debate, rather than trying to straight-jacket it—will be far more fruitful in remedying the ailment he so accurately diagnosed.

June 8, 2017

The Humanitarian Paradigm – Answering FAQs (Part 2)

Sequel to the dispelling of doubts regarding the feasibility – and morality – of largescale, financially incentivized emigration as the only non-kinetic approach for resolution of the Israel-Palestinian impasse.

The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity. The optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty. -Widely attributed to Winston Churchill

Readers will recall that last week I began a two part response to FAQs (Frequently Asked Questions) relating to the practical feasibility/moral acceptability of my proposed Humanitarian Paradigm (HP), which prescribes, among other measures, large-scale financially incentivized emigration of the Palestinian-Arabs, living across the pre-1967 lines as the only route to attain long-term survivability for Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

To recap briefly

In last week’s column, I addressed the question of the overall cost of the funded emigration project, and showed that, given the political will to implement it, it would be eminently affordable – even if Israel had to shoulder the burden alone. If other industrial nations could be induced to participate, the total cost would be an imperceptible percentage of their GDP.

I then went on to demonstrate that there is ample evidence indicating a wide-spread desire in large sections of the Palestinian-Arab population to emigrate permanently in search of more secure and prosperous livee elsewhere. This point was underscored by a recent Haaretz article , describing how thousands of Gazans had fled their home to Greece, undertaking perilous risk to extricate themselves from the harrowing hardships imposed on them by the ill-conceived endeavor to foist statehood on the Palestinian-Arabs. Significantly, according to the Haaretz report, none of them blamed Israel for their plight—but rather the ruling Hamas-regime, which, it will be recalled, was elected by popular vote to replace the rival Fatah faction, ousted because of its corruption and poor governance.

Finally, I dealt with the question of the prospective host nations, pointing out that the funded Palestinian-Arab émigrés would not arrive as an uncontrolled deluge of destitute humanity, but as an orderly regulated stream of relatively affluent immigrants spread over about a decade-and-a-half, whose absorption would entail significant capital inflows for the host nation’s economy. Moreover, given the fact that, globally, migrants total almost a quarter billion, Palestinian-Arab migration of several hundred thousand a year would comprise a small fraction of one percent of the overall number—hardly an inconceivable prospect.

Following this short summary of previously addressed FAQs, we can now move on to tackle several additional ones.

FAQ 4: Won’t fear of fratricide deter recipients?

One of the most commonly raised reservations as to the practical applicability of the HP is that potential recipients of the relocation/rehabilitation grants would be deterred from accepting them because of threats of retribution from their kin-folk who allegedly would view such action as perfidious betrayal of the Palestinian-Arabs’ national aspirations.

In contending with this question, it is necessary to distinguish between two possible scenarios, in which such internecine intimidation will be either a phenomenon whose scope is (a) limited; or (b) wide-spread and pervasive.

Clearly, if the former is true, it is unlikely to have any significant inhibiting impact on the conduct of prospective recipients of the relocation/rehabilitation grants.

If, however, the assumption is that the latter is the case, several points need to be made:

– If this objection to the HP is to have any credence, its proponents must present evidence (as opposed to unproven supposition) that potential violent opponents of the HP program have the ability not only to inflict harm on prospective recipients (as opposed to issuing empty threats) , but that they can sustain such ability over time.

– In this regard, it should be kept in mind that implementation of the HP entails the disarming, dismantling and disbanding —if need be, coercively—of the ruling Palestinian regime, and reinstating Israeli governance over all territory under Palestinian-Arab control.

Inhibiting internecine intimidation

The HP is hardly unique with regard to this latter point. All other proffered policy alternatives for the failed, foolhardy two-state formula entail such measures—either by explicit stipulation, or implicit inference—since preserving the current Palestinian regime intact would clearly preclude their implementation. Indeed, they are even endorsed by some pundits who do not discount the eventual emergence of a Palestinian state, such as Middle East Forum president, Daniel Pipes.

Clearly, the dispersal of the central Palestinian governing body, together with the defanging of its armed organs and the deployment of Israeli forces in their stead , will greatly curtail (although not entirely eliminate) the scope for internecine intimidation and the capacity to dissuade potential recipients of the relocation/rehabilitation grants from availing themselves of the funds.

In addition, Israel should task its own formidable military and intelligence services to protect prospective recipients of these grants by identifying, intervening and thwarting attempts to intimidate those seeking to enhance their lives by extricating themselves from the control of the disastrously dysfunctional regime under which they live.

Moreover, the international community should be called upon to cooperate with and participate in this principled endeavor to prevent fratricidal elements within Palestinian society from depriving their brethren of the opportunity of better, safer lives. After all, violence against Palestinian-Arabs, who choose to reside within any given host nation, would comprise an intolerable violation of that country’s national sovereignty.

Appalling indictment of “Palestinian” society?

Of course invoking the specter of large-scale fratricide as an impediment to the acceptance of the HP is an appalling indictment of Palestinian-Arab society.

After all, the inescapable implication of such an objection to the HP’s practical applicability is that its acceptance by otherwise willing recipients, wishing to avail themselves of opportunity to seek security and prosperity elsewhere, can only be impeded by violent extortion of their kin-folk.

Accordingly, if the concern over large-scale fratricide is serious, it is in fact, at once, both the strongest argument in favor of the HP and against the establishment of a Palestinian state. After all, two unavoidable conclusions necessarily flow from it: (a) any predicted reluctance to accept the relocation/rehabilitating grants would not be a reflection of the free will of Palestinian-Arabs, but rather a coerced outcome that came about despite the fact that it is not; (b) Similarly, the endeavor for a Palestinian state is not one that manifests any authentic desire of the “Palestinian people” but rather one imposed on them, despite the fact that it does not.

As a result, any Palestinian-Arab state established under the pervasive threat of lethal retribution against any dissenter will not be an expression of genuine national aspirations but of extortion and coercion of large segments of Palestinian-Arab society, who would otherwise opt for an alternative outcome.

In summation then, if the fear of fratricide can be shown to be a tangible threat, it should not be considered a reason to abandon the HP formula. Quite the opposite! It should be considered an unacceptable phenomenon to be resolutely suppressed –by both Israel and the international community—in order to permit the Palestinian-Arab public the freedom of choice to determine their future.

FAQ 5: Would funded emigration not be considered unethical “ethnic cleansing”?

I have addressed the question of the moral merits of the HP extensively elsewhere (see “Palestine”: Who Has Moral High Ground?), where I demonstrate that the HP blueprint will be the most humane of all options if it succeeds, and the least inhumane if it does not.

I shall therefore refrain from repeating much of the arguments presented previously and focus on one crucial issue: The comparative moral merits of the widely endorsed two-state paradigm (TSS) and those of my proposed Humanitarian Paradigm (HP).

Since there is very little doubt (or dispute) as to the domestic nature of any prospective Palestinian state, anyone seeking to disqualify the HP because of its alleged moral shortcomings must be forced to contend with the following question: Who has the moral high-ground?

(a) The TSS-proponents, who advocate establishing (yet another) homophobic, misogynistic Muslim-majority tyranny, whose hallmarks would be: gender discrimination, gay persecution, religious intolerance, and political oppression of dissidents? ; or

(b) The HP-proponents who advocate providing non-belligerent Palestinian individuals with the opportunity of building a better life for themselves elsewhere, out of harm’s way, free from the recurring cycles of death, destruction and destitution, brought down on them by the cruel, corrupt cliques that have led them astray for decades.

Furthermore, TSS advocates should be compelled to clarify why they consider it morally acceptable to offer financial inducements to Jews in Judea-Samaria to evacuate their homes to facilitate the establishment of said homophobic, misogynistic tyranny, which, almost certainly, will become a bastion for Islamist terror; yet they consider it morally reprehensible to offer financial inducements to Arabs in Judea-Samaria to evacuate their homes to prevent the establishment of such an entity?

FAQ 6: What about those who remain?

This is, of course, a serious question and a detailed response would depend on, among other things, the size of the residual Palestinian-Arab population who refuse any material compensation as an inducement to emigrate.

The acuteness of the problem would undoubtedly be a function of its scale. Clearly, the smaller this residual population, the less pressing the need will be to deal with it. For example it seems plausible that if, say, only a hundred thousand Palestinians remain, consideration may well be given to the possibility of offering them Israeli citizenship – subject to stringent security vetting and sworn acceptance of Jewish sovereignty as the sole legitimate source of authority in the land – without endangering the Jewish character of the country.

However, it should be remembered that, unlike the two-state approach which advocates perilous concessions, and the one-state prescription which calls for incorporating the Palestinian-Arabs resident across the pre-1967 lines into Israel’s permanent population, the HP does not involve any cataclysmic irreversible measures.

At the heart of the HP program is a comprehensive system of material inducements to foster Palestinian emigration, which includes generous incentives for leaving and harsh disincentives for staying. As detailed elsewhere, such incentives would entail substantial monetary grants, up to 100 years GDP per capita per family in Palestinian terms; while the latter entail phased withdrawal of services (including provision of water, electricity, fuel, port facilities and so on) that Israel currently provides to the Palestinian-Arabs across the pre-1967 lines.

Accordingly, should it be found that the initial proposed inducements are ineffective, the former can be made more enticing, and/or the latter more daunting, until the proffered package is acceptable.

Seen in this context, it is difficult to envisage that many non-belligerent Palestinian-Arabs would prefer to endure the rigors of discontinued provision of services rather than avail themselves of the generous relocation/rehabilitation funds—especially given the dispersal of the Palestinian regime as an alternative source of such services.

FAQ 7 What if the same kind of offer were made to induce Jewish emigration?

In addressing this question several points should be borne in mind:

The offer would clearly not be made by an Israeli government. After all, the HP is intended as a measure to: (a) Ensure – not undermine – the survival of Israel as the nation-state of the Jews, and (b) Relieve the genuine humanitarian predicament of the Palestinian-Arabs—precipitated by the dysfunctional administration they have been subjected to since the 1993 Oslo process—not Jewish disgruntlement with the imperfect functioning of the Israeli government.

Of course, it would be impossible to prevent Arab elements from offering Jews financial inducement to emigrate from Israel, but in this regard it should be recalled that: (a) As a sovereign nation Israel can control the financial flows into the country and impede money from hostile sources reaching Israeli citizens, considerably complicating the transfer and receipt of funds. (b) Arab governments have been singularly reticent in providing large sums to advance the “Palestinian cause” and there is little chance (or evidence) that they would advance the hundreds of billions required to finance large scale Jewish emigration; (c) The overwhelming majority of Israelis enjoy living standards of an advanced post-industrial nation with a GDP per capita around 20 times higher than that in the Palestinian-administered territories; (d) Accordingly, it would be commensurately more difficult to tempt them to leave. Indeed, sums offered would have to be considerably higher to create a comparable incentive, running into millions rather than hundreds of thousands per family. (e) Moreover, a slew of recent polls show the large majority of Israelis are satisfied with their lives – thus the prospect of material incentives to induce large-scale emigration seems remote.

Urgent Zionist imperative.

The HP is the only Zionist-compliant policy prescription that can save Israel from the perilous dangers of the two-state formula and the specter of Lebanonization/Balkanization inherent in other proffered alternatives. Embarking on its implementation is a Zionist imperative that is both urgent and feasible.